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A bill to be entitled

3

DRAFT

An act relating to the waiver of sovereign immunity;

4
5

7

9

3

able, the rates are exorbitant and often beyond the ability of

the local taxpayers to afford, and

6

present statute, NOW THEREFORE

8

Be It Enacted By The Legislature Of The State Of Florida:

7

9

10

creating and subsequently amending sections 768.28 and

11

state and its agencies or subdivisions for liability for

13

768.30, Florida Statutes,waived the sovereign i11111unity of the

12

14

torts, and

14

16

the Legislature clearly intended to make the state, the

16

12

13

·15

17
18

I

WHEREAS, in enacting section 768,28, Florida Statutes,

counties, and the municipalities liable for tort claims in the
same manner and to·the same extent as a private individual

19

under like circumstances, and

21

!!!!!.!

23

of a municipality without unconsitutionally restricting the

20

24

25

26

WHEREAS, the Florida Supreme Court in Fisher v. City of
(Fla. 1965), 172 So. 2d 455, indica�ed that the Legi

slature could restrict the amount of recovery for the torts

right of an individual to receive compensation for injuries,
and

WHEREAS, the Attorney General, in his opinion number

27

076-41, dated February 23, 1976, failed to recognize the basis

29

aection 768.28, Florida Statute&, and

28
30

Jl

for the limitation of liability set forth in subsection 5 of
WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that local governments

I �hroughout

;

the state, becauss of the uncertainty caused bJ

obtaining liability insurance, and, if the insurance is avail-

4

are included in the $100,000 per occurrence limi

WHEREAS, Chapters 73-313 and.74-235, Laws of Florida,

11

the Attorney General's opinion, are experiencing difficulty

2

S

tation of liability; providing an effective date.

8

l

amending subsection 5 of section 768.28, Florida

Statutes, to clarify that agencies and subdivisions

6

I s /2 <--� o

15

WHEREAS, this problem requires clarification of the

Section 1. Subsection 5 of section 768.28, Florida

Statutes, is amended to read:
768.28

Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions:

recovery limits; limitation on attorney fees; statute of

1imitations: e�usions.(5) The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall

17

be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same

19

liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for

21

agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay a claim or

18

20

extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but

the period prior to judgment.

Neither the state nor its

22

a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of $50,000,

24

totaled with all other claims or judgments paid-�y-•ke-s•••e

23 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which, when
25

arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the

27

claimed and rendered in excess of these amounts and may be

29

$100,000 as the case may be, and that portion of the judgment

26

sum of $100,000.

However, a judgment or judgments may be

28 settled and paid pursuant to this act up to $50,000 or
30

31

that exceed■ theae amount• may be reported to the lerisl-ature,
but may be paid in part or in wbOle only by further act of

G-o

1
2
J
4

5
6
7
B
9

10

11
12
13
14

15
16
17
1B
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
,26
27
28
29
30

31

the legislature.
a law.

Section 2,

This act shall take effect upon becoming
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A bill to be entitled

3

6

8
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15

16

able, the rates are exorbitant and often beyond the ability of

6

present statute, NOW THEREFORE

tation of liability; providing an effective date.

8

WHEREAS, Chapters 73-313 and.74-235, Laws of Florida,

5

10

creating and subsequently amending sections 768.28 and

state and its agencies or subdivisions for liability for

13

torts, and

WHEREAS, in enacting section 768.28, Florida Statutes,

the Legislature clearly intended to make the state, the

12
14

15
16

counties, and the municipalities liable for tort claims in the

17

19

under like circumstances, and

19

21

!!.!:!!!! (Fla. 1965), 172 So. 2d 455, indicated that the Legi

21

23

of a municipality without unconsitutionally restricting the

23

20

24

same manner and to the same extent as a private individual

WHEREAS, the Florida Supreme Court in Fisher v. City of

slature could restrict the amount of recovery for the torts

right of an individual to receive compensation for injuries,

(5)

The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall

be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same

liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for
Neither the state nor its

agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay a claim or

24

totaled with all other claims or judgments paid-�y-lhe-etale

or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which, when

25

arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the

27

claimed and rendered in excess of these amounts and may be

29

throughout the state, because of the uncertainty caused by

31

n

limitations; exlusions.-

a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of $50,000,

section 768.28, Florida Statutes, and

WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that local governments

recovery limits; limitation on attorney fees; statute of

22

29

30

I

Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions;

the period prior to judgment.

076-41, dated February 23, 1976, failed to recognize the buis
for the limitation of liability set forth in subsection 5 of

768.28

20

27

28

Statutes, is amended to read:

extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but

and

WHEREAS, the Attorney General, in his opinion number

I

Section 1. Subsection 5 of section 768.28, Florida

18

25

26

Be It Enacted By The Legislature Of The State Of Florida:

9

11

768. 30, Florida Statutes,waived the sovereign immunity of the

WHEREAS, this problem requires clarification of the

7

17

18

obtaining liability insurance, and, if the insurance is avail-

Statutes, to clarify that agencies an� subdivisions
are included in the $100,000 per occurrence limi

7

3

2

the local taxpayers to afford, and

amending subsection 5 of section 768.28, Florida

5

the Attorney General's opinion, are experiencing difficulty

4

An act relating to the waiver of sovereign immunity;

4
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DRAFT

1

26

sum of $100,000.

However, a judgment or judgments may be

28

settled and paid pursuant to this act up to $50,000 or

30

that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the legisl-ature,

$100,000 as the case may be, and that portion of the judgment
but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of

1 I the legislature.
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3 I a law.
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Section 2.

This act shall take effect upon becoming

Florida House of Representatives - 1977
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Community Affairs
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Statutes, relating to the limitation upon the
total amount of multiple claims arising out of
the same incident; providing an effective date.
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WHEREAS, chapters 73-313 and 74-235, Laws of Florida,
creating and subsequently amending ss. 768.28 and 768.30,
Florida Statutes, waived the sovereign immunity of the state
and its agencies or subdivisions for liability for tort

12

claims, and

14

Legislature clearly intended to make the state, the counties,

13
15

�1::

WHEREAS, in enacting s. 768.28, Florida Statutes, the
and the municipalities liable for tort claims in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
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like circumstances, and
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torts of a municipality without unconstitutionally restricting
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WHEREAS, the Florida Supreme Court in Fisher v. City of
Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, (Fla. 1965), indicated that the
Legislature could restrict the amount of recovery for the
the rigot of an individual to receive compensation for
injuries, and
WHEREAS, the Attorney General, in his opinion 076-41,
dated February 23, 1976, failed to recognize the basis for the
limitation of liability set forth in subsection (5) of s.

27

768.28, Florida Statutes, and

29

throughout the state, because of the uncertainty caused by the

28

30
31

WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that local governments
Attorney General's opinion, are experiencing difficulty
obtaining liability insurance, and, if the insurance is
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available, the rates are exorbitant and often beyond the

2 ability of the local taxpayers to afford, and
1
WHEREAS, this problem requires clarification of the
3

1

1
1

41 present statute, NOW, THEREFORE,

1

61 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

1

5

Subsection (5) of section 768.28, Florida

1

waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions;

2

Section 1.

91 Statutes, is amended to read:
768.28

10

111

recovery

limits; limitation on attorney fees; statute of

121 limitation; exclusions.-(5)

13

The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall

WI be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same

151 e xtent as a private individual under like circumstances, but
16

17

1

18
1

19

liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for

the period prior to judgment.

Neither the state nor its

agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay a claim or a
judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of $50,000,

*****************************************

1

'
6

10

2

11

2

13

12

14

2

2

2

3

15
16

17

18

19

3,

20

UI arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the

3.

22

231 sum of $100,000. However, a judgment or judgments may be

UI claimed and rendered in excess of these amounts and may be

3.

3.

3.l
� settled and paid pursuant to this act up to $50,000 or
,
,
U $100,000, as the case may be, and that portion of the Judgment 3.C

DI that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the legislature, 13,(
� but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the
,
legislature.

29

30

311

law.

Section 2.

This act shall take effect upon becoming a
2
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Provides that provisions which limit to $100,000 the
total amount of liability for multiple claims or
judgments arising out of the same incident under the
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity shall be
applicable to claims or judgments against agencies and
subdivisions of the state.

9

�I or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which, when

211 totaled with all other claims or judgments peid-by-the-5tete
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302
Yeas--87
Mr. President Gorman
Casto!
Graham
Chamberlin Hair
Childers, Don Henderson

Plante

Poston

Renick
Sayler

Tobiassen
Trask
Vogt
Ware

May 2, 1977

By the Committee on Jud!ciary-CriminalCS for SB 960-A bill to be entitled An act relatin t
organized crime; making it unlawful to use or invest proceg ed°
from a pattern of racketeering conduct or from the collectio 8
of an unlawful debt to acQuire or maintain an interest in, or t�

eat.ablieh or conduct an enterpriae, includinr real propert ,
providing e.n affirmative defense; makinr it un1aw:ful to acqut�
or maintain an interest in, or to conduct an enterprise, includhi
real property, through a pat.tern of racketeering cond1ict orr
through the collection of an unlawtul debt; making it uniawtul
to conspire or endeavor to engage in 1uch conduct, or to
solicit, coerce, or intimidate another to do 10• pro'ridln_K criminal
penaltl.ea; providing procedures and crlter!a for adJudl catinr
certain peraon1 to be dangerous 1pecial racketeers ; provldi ni •,.
B1 th& Connnittee on Go,·ernmental Operations and Senator, criminal p@nalty :for a dan1erous Epaclal racketeer; provl dinll an
11lternative fine; prov!dlnr for the t!,a:hts o! innocent person,· ,.
D�hilden and Zinkl!�
providing chil remedies of dlveatiture, rusonable reatriction�
CS for SB S9�A bill ta be entitled An act :relating to the on, future activities, dissolution or reorganlzat!on o:f any enter. 7r,
waiver of. aoverelgn immunity; amending g, 768,28 (5), Florida prise revocation or l'!Uapenslon of licfl:r.eea or permltg, and •.
Statutes, to clarify that agenelea and aubdivl1lon1 are included forfeiture of col'li'oratfon charter or revocation of certlflcatci . : ,
in the s100..., ooo per occurrence limitation of liability; rel)ealing authorizing a fore1gn col'!loration to conduct bualnes■ wlth!n thla .:5
1, 788.28 (1u), Florida Sta.tutu, which provide■ that the limit&• atate providing for ae!rure 11.nd state disposal of seized and for. '
tlons of thi1 act not appl;v to the extent the agency is insured faiteai property; providing that any a gg?!eYed p1r1on ma)• !l'l� \'I.
and allows agenc!ea to join together to purchase 1nliurance; pro stitut1 civil proce@dings to seek treble damages, attornev's tee,.; ..
v!cl!nir an e.ffective date.
and punitive damages: :providing for civil investigative · demand
any agency having jurl1dlction to inyestipte as a crime
-waa read the first tlma by title and SB 896 waa laid on for
or aa a violation of sta.te rei'Ulatory lawa or rule11; J)rovidlnr ,
the tabla.
procedures for using civil lnvHtigat.ive demand ; pro','ldinc for ':
the confidentiality of documenta.ey material produced under·.
On motion by Benlto:r Don Childera, br two-third■ vote CS a civil inve1tigative demand and :for the retUl'!J or dl1pour
of 1uch material after the conclusion of. such inveatigatlor. 1,:,
for SB 888 waa read the Hcond time by title.
amtndin1 s, 905,84, Florida Statutea; extending th■ subject,
matter Jurisdiction of the state wide i'J'and 1ury to in<:Jud•·
S11\ator Johnlt011 presldlnf
v!olatlona of thi1 11.ct: an1endlng s. 934.07, Florida Statutear
allowing authorization for the intersection o:f wire or oral com• .
Sens.tor■ McClain and Ware offered the follow!nir amend munieatlons to pro\'id1 evidence of. any violation of the pro�t
vlm!ona of this act and certain other o:ffensea; providing 1ev1r�
ment which was n1oved by Senator McClain:
abillty; providing an effect!va date,
Amendment 1-0n 'Pa,e B, strike all of lin•e 8 and 4 and
-wa■ read the first time by title and SB 960 Wal laid
renumber aubsequent aectiona.
the table.
:_
Amendment 1 failed by the followinr vote :
On motion by Senator Dunn, bf two-thirds vote CS for
980 waa read the second time by tit1e.
Yeu-1"
·�,
.. ;
Tob!Hsen
Peterson
Gorman
Castor
On
point
of
order
by
Senator
Lewia
SB
84.9
wa■
remo•11q
.
Vogt
Savlar
Graham
Dunn
from the calendar and referred to the Committee on App
Ware
Spfcola
Lewis
Firestone
priati ons pursuant to Rule 4.8.
Williamson
Thomas, Pat
McClain
Gallen
On motion by Senator Le'l'.i1 the rule■ were waive d and tll1
N•ya-20
Committee on Appropriations was rtl'Anted penniaslon to met'
Wednesday, May 4 and Thuradat, May 5 :from 5 :00 p.�
SkJnner
Plante
He�deraon
Chamberlin
i
ur.t!l 9:00 p.m. In lieu of 5 :00 p,tn. until 7 :00 p.m.
Thom11.1, Jon
Poston
Childers, Don Holloway
Trask
Renick
Johnston
Gliuon
CO-bi'TRODCCERS
Winn
Scarborougn
MacKay
Gordon
Z1nkil
Scott
Myer,
Hair
Senator Graham-Senate Bill, Sf/4 1.nd 176; Senator• GJiH,
and W. D. Childers-SB 808; Senator MacKay-SB 906; Senato'i
Jon Thomas-SB 1094; Senator Gallen-SB 8715
The Pn11ldent preeidinll'
Senators Maclt&y and Ware off@nd the following amendment CORRECTIOX AND .APPROYA.L OF JOURNAL
which w11.1 moved by Senator MacKay:
The Journal of April 29 wu corrt-cted and
Amendment 2-0n pa� 8, line 5, insert: Section 8. Citiu, follows :
counties and 1ehool board11 :nay, Individually or in an,1 combf.
Page 270, column, 1, tran!l>OH llnea 8 and 4
nation, @nter i:ito risk mana,en1ent arran&'ement. mvolvlna
J1artl&l or total 1elf-ln&lll't1Me, Provided, such :ri1k management
Page 270, column .2, line 84, etrlke "ll 77" and ln11trt: 11
11.rr&ngements muat b11 approved for aetut.:rial aoundnesa br the
.Florida Department of I:111uran;1
Th• Journal of April 27 wu further corrected and approved ;,
i
followe :
(ztenutnber 1ub1S1quent aections.)
;
Paire 248, column 2, strike lines 10 throua-h 12
Senator Plante moved that the Senata recon1ider the vote
by which Am,ndment 1 failed and the motion ,n■ adop�d.
The hour of adjournmer:t having ar?i'l"ed, a point of 0
ven•
wall ca.ll@d and the Senate adjourned at 5 :00 ,m. to eon
ti
n
On motion by Senator Pat Thomar., !urther consideration S:80 a.m., lrlay 8, 197i for tha purpose o, lntrodu c olut
reference o:f' reaolutions, memorials, billa and joint r111o 1
o:f CS tor SB 896 was deferred.

Childera, W. D.
Dunn
Fire.ion■
Gallen
Glluon
Gorda!'I
Nare.-None

Rolloway
John1ton
Lewia
MacKay
Myers
Peterson

Scarborourh
Scott
Skinner
§picola
Thomas, Jon
Thom11.11, Pat

Willfam11on
Winn
Zinkil
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Senator Hair moved the following amendments which were
adopted:
Amendment 1-On page 1, line 28, after the period insert:
However, as a condition for approval of a policy loan interest
rate in excess of 6 percent per annum, the Insurance Commis
sioner and Treasurer shall require the insurer to furnish such
assurances as the Commissioner deems necessary that the in
terest rate on such loans will bear a reasonable relationship
to other interest rates al'\d that the holders of such policies will
benefit through higher dividends or lower premiums, or both.

351

On motion by Senator Glisson, by two-thirds vote SB 343 was
read the third time by title, passed and certified to the House.
The vote on passage was:
Yeas--37

Tobiassen
Peterson
Mr. President Gorman
Trask
Plante
Graham
Castor
Vogt
Poston
Hair
Chamberlin
Ware
Sayler
Henderson
Childers, Don
Williamson
Scarborough
Childers, W. D. Holloway
Wilson
Scott
Johnston
Amendment 2-0n page 1, in title, line 4 insert after the Dunn
Winn
Skinner
IA!wis
semicolon: providing a condition for approval of a policy loan Firestone
Spicola
MacKay
Gallen
interest rate in excess of 6 percent;
Thomas,Jon
Glisson
McClain
Thomas,Pat
. Gordon
Myers
On motion by Senator Hair, by two-thirds vote SB 891 as
amended was read the third time by title, passed, ordered en
grossed and then certified to ·the House. The vote on passage Nays-None
was:
CS for SB 396-A bill to be entitled An act relating to the
waiver of soverei gn immunityi amending s. 768.28(5), Florida
Yeas-27
Statutes, to clarify that agencies and subdivisions are included
Peterson
Thomas,Jon
Mr.President Graham
in the $100,000 per occurrence limitation of liability; repealing
Hair
s. 768.28(10), Florida Statutes, which provides that the limita
Poston
Trask
Castor
Holloway
Chamberlin
Sayler
Vofil
tions of this act not apply to the extent the agency is insured
Scarborough
Wi Hamson
Childers, Don Johnston
and allows agencies to join together to purchase insurance;
Lewis
Scott
Winn
Dunn
providing an effective date.
McClain
Glisson
Skinner
Zinkll
Myers
Spicola
Gorman
-was taken up with pending Amendments 1 and 2 which
were withdrawn.
Nays-7
Childers, W. D. Henderson
Gordon
Plante

Thomas.Pat
Tobiassen

Wilson

By the Committee on Executive Business and Senators Gra
ham, Zinkil, Sayler, Wilson, and PostonCS for SB 38-A bill to be entitled An act relating to execu
tive departments of the state; amending s. 20.05(7), Florida
Statutes; providing that departmental executive directors shall
serve no more than 4 years without reappointment and recon
firmation; amending ss. 20.21(1), 20.22(1), 20.24(1), 20.25(1),
and adding s. 20.28(4), Florida Statutes; requiring Senate con
firmation of executive directors of certain departments; provid
ing an effective date.
-was read the first time by title and SB 38 was laid on the
table.
On motions by Senator Graham, by two-thirds vote CS for SB
88 was read the second time by title and by two-thirds vote was
read the third time by title, passed and certified to the House.
The vote on passage was:
Yeas-35
Mr.President
(:astor
Chamberlin
Childers, Don
Childers, W. D.
Dunn
Gallen
Glisson
Gorman

Graham
Hair
Henderson
Holloway
Johnston
Lewis
MacKay
McClain
Myers

Peterson
Plante
Poston
Sayler
Scarborough
Scott
Skinner
Spicola
Thomas,Jon

Thoma11,Pat
Tobiassen
Trask
Vogt
Williamson
Wilson
Winn
Zinkil

Nays-None
SB 343-A bill to be entitled An act relating to the Work
men's Compensation Law; amending s. 440.02(2) (d), Florida
Statutes, redefining the term "employee" for the pm-poses of
the Workmen's Compensation Law to exclude real estate sales
men or agents who perform services for remuneration solely
by way of commission; providing an effective date.
-was read the second time by title.
The Committee on Commerce offered the following amend
ments which were moved by Senator Plante and failed:
Amendment 1-0n page 1, lines 20 and 21, strike "real
estate"
Amendment 2-0n page 1, line 6, strike "real estate"

Senators Don Childers and Zinkil offered the following
amendment which was moved by Senator. Don Childers and
adopted:
Amendment 3-On page 3, 11trike all of lines 5 and 6 and
insert: Section 3. Subsection (14) is added to section 768.28,
Florida Statutes, to read:
768.28 Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions; re
covery limits; limitation on attorney fees; statute of limita
tions; exclusions.(14) The state and its agencies and subdivisions are hereby
authorized to be self-insured, or to enter into risl, management
programs, or to purchase liability insurance for whatever cov
era.ge they m.ay choose, or to have any combination thereof,
for any claim, judgment, an.cl claims bill which they may be
lia.ble to pay pursua.nt to this section.

Section 4.

This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.

Senators Don Childers, Zinkil and Ware offered the following
amendment which was moved by Senator Ware and adopted:
Amendment 4-On page 2, line 25, strike the words: "tt&M e,
� �" and insert: paid by the state or its agencies or sub
divisions
On motion by Senator Dunn, the Senate reconsidered the vote
by which Amendment 3 was adopted. The question recurred
on the adoption of Amendment 3, which was adopted.
Senators Don Childers and Zinkil offered the following amend
ment which was moved by Senator Childers and adopted:
Amendment 5-0n page 1 in title, strike all of line 11 and
insert: insurance; adding a new subsection (14) to s. 768.28,
Florida Statutes, to authorize self-insurance, risk management
programs, or the purchase of liability insurance, or any combi
nation thereof, for any claim, judgment, or claims bill which
the state, its agencies or subdivisions, may be liable to pay
pursuant to s. 768.28, Florida Statutes; providing an effective
date.
Senators MacKay and Ware offered the following amend
ment which was moved by Senator Ware and adopted:
Amendment 6--On page 1 In title, line 11, after the semi
colon insert: authorizing cities, counties, and school boards to
enter into risk management arrangements;
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On motion by Senator Don Childers, by two-thirds vote
CS for SB 396 as amended was read the third time by title,
passed, ordered engrossed and then certified to the House.
The vote on passage was:
Yeall--S8
Mr. President
Castor
Chamberlin
Childers, Don
Childers, W. D.
Dunn
Firestone
Gallen
Glisson
Gordon
Nays-None

Gorman
Graham
Hair
Henderson
Holloway
Johnston
Lewis
MacKay
McClain
Myers

Peterson
Plante
Poston
Sayler
Scarborough
Scott
Skinner
Spicola
Thomas,Jon
Thomas,Pat

Tobiassen
Trask
Vogt
Ware
Williamson
Wilson
Winn
Zinkil

SB 424-A bill to be entitled An act relating to home solici
tation sales; amending BB, 601.021 and 601.026, Florida Statutes;
providing definitions; providing that sales solicited by telephone
are home solicitation sales; providing a lower minimum value
of sales included as home solicitation sales; :providing that a
buyer has 3 business days to cancel a home solicitation sale and
defining "business day"; creating ss. 601.046, 601.047, 601.062,
Florida Statutes; directing sellers to present certain prescribed
identification to prospective buyers; directing that certain in
formation identifying the seller be left with the buyer, or, in
the case of telephone solicitations, be sent to the buyer; pro
hibiting misrepresentation regarding certain facts relating to
the nature of the sale, the parent company, or the terms and
conditions of the sale; directing the Division of Consumer Serv
ices of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
to investigate violations and to seek injunctive relief; providing
an effective date.
-was read the second time by title.

May 9, 1977

SB 450-A bill to be entitled An act relating to the Suwann
River Authority; providing an appropriation for use by thet
authoritr in its pollution control program; providing that suche
appropriation does not have to be matched by the counties·' providing an effective date.
-was read the second time by title.
The Committee on Appropriations offered the followinr
amendment which was moved by Senator Skinner and adopted:
Amendment 1-On page 1, strike all of lines 9 through 21
The Committee on Natural Resources and Conservation of.
fered the following amendment which was moved by Senator
Skinner and adopted:
Amendment 2-0n page 1, line 30, strike "74-404" and insert:
74-403
On motion by Senator Skinner, by two-thirds vote SB 460
as amended was read the third time by title, passed, ordered
engrossed and then certified to the House. The vote on passage
was:
Yeas-36
Mr. President
Castor
Chamberlin
Childers, Don
Childers, W. D.
Dunn
Firestone
Gallen
Glisson

Gordon
Gorman
Graham
Henderson
Holloway
Johnston
Lewis
MacKay
McClain

Myers
Peterson
Plante
Poston
Sayler
Scarborough
Scott
Skinner
Spicola

Thomas,Jon
Thomas,Pat
Tobiassen
Trask
Vogt
Williamson
Wilson
Winn
Zinkil

Nays-None
Senator Castor moved the following amendments which were
adopted:
Vote after roll call:
Amendment 1-On page 2, line 6, strike "$10 �." and in
Yea-Hair
sert after "of": $26 which includes all interest, service charges,
finance charges, postage, freight, insurance, service or hand
ling charges,
SB 678-A bill to be entitled An act relating to licensing
of vehicles; amending s. 316.284, Florida Statutes; providing
Amendment 2-On page 3, line 18, strike "photograph"
that nothing may be placed on the face of a license plate ex
Amendment 3--On page 3, line 26, insert: after "business cept as permitted by law; providing an effective date.
card": or receipt
-was read the second time by title. On motion by Senator
Amendment 4-On page 3, line 26, strike "1. The seller's Holloway, by two-thirds vote SB 678 was read the third time
name;" and renumber the following sections
by title, passed and certified to the House. The vote on passage
was:
Amendment 5--On page 3, line 30, strike "'s supervisor." and
insert a period
Yeas-22
Amendment 6-On page 4, line 21, insert after "to the":
Attorney General or
Castor
Scott
Glisson
MacKay
Gordon
Thomas,Pat
McClain
Amendment 7-On page 1 in title, line 6-8, strike the words Chamberlin
Williamson
Myers
"providing a lower minimum value of sales included as home Childers, Don Gorman
Graham
Zinkil
Poston
solicitation sales;" and insert: providing that the minimum Dunn
Holloway
Firestone
Sayler
value of sales includes related expenses and charges;
Lewis
Gallen
Scarborough
On motion by Senator Castor, by two-thirds vote SB 424
as amended was read the third time by title, passed, ordered Nays-16
engrossed and then certified to the House. The vote on passage
Mr. President Peterson
Ware
Thomas,Jon
was:
Childers, W. D. Plante
Wilson
Tobiassen
Winn
Henderson
Skinner
Trask
Yeas-36
Johnston
Spicola
Vogt
Peterson
Thomas,Pat
Mr. President Gorman
Plante
Tobiassen
Graham
Castor
Vote after roll call:
Trask
Poston
Henderson
Chamberlin
Sayler
Vogt
Childers, Don Holloway
Yea-Hair
Ware
Scarborough
Childers, W. D. Johnston
Williamson
Scott
LewiR
Firestone
Wilson
Skinner
Gallen
MacKay
SB 590--A bill to be entitled An act relating to lntansrible
Winn
Spicola
McClain
Glisson
personal property tax; adding paragraph (g) to s. 199.072(1),
Zinkil
Thomas,Jon
Gordon
Myers
Florida Statutes, exempting from intangible personal property
tax the assets of a corporation registered under the Investment
Nays-None
Company Act of 1940 of the United States; providing an ef
fective date.
Vote after roll call:
Yea-Hair

-was read the second time by title.
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House of Representatives

ORGANIZATl,ON SESSION
and

FIRST REGULAR SESSION
of the

FIFTH LEGISLATURE
[ under the Constitution as Revised in 1968]

NOVEMBER 16, 1976
and

APRIL 5 through JUNE 3, 1977
[Including a record of transmittal of Acts subsequent to sine die adjournment]

May 18, 1977
Lockward
· Malloy
Margolis
Maxwell
McCall
McDonald
McKnight
McPherson
Melvin
M ica
Mixson

Moffitt
Moore,R.
Moore, T.
Morgan
Neal
Nelson
Nuckolls
Ogden
O'Malley
Pajcic
Papy

JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Patchett
Patterson
Poindexter
Poole
Ready
Redman
Richard
Richmond
Rish
Robinson
Ryals

Sample
Sheldon
Smith
Taylor
Thompson
Ward
Warner
Woodruff
Young

Nays-1
Martin
Votes after roll call:
Yeas-Williams, Craig
Nays-Sadowski
So the bill passed, as further amended. The action, together
with the bill and amendments thereto, was certified to the
Senate.
The H01torcible DoMld L. Tucker, Spea,ker

I am directed to inform the House of Representatives that
the Senate has passedHB 1068
HB 626
HB 62
HB 1238
Joe Brown, Secretary

The bills were ordered enrolled.
Consideration of CS for SB 396
On motion by Mr. McPherson, the rules were waived and
CS for SB 396 was taken up instanter.
�
CS for SB 396-A bill to be entitled An act relating to the
waiver of sovereign immunity; amending s. 768.28(5), Florida
Statutes, to clarify that agencies and subdivisions are included
in the $100,000 per occurrence limitation of liability; repealing
s. 768.28(10), Florida Statutes, which provides that the limita
tions of this act not apply to the extent the agency is insured
and allows a�ncies to join together to purchase insurance;
authorizing cities, counties, and school boards to enter into
risk management arrangements; adding a new subsection (14)
to s. 768.28, Florida Statutes, to authorize self-insurance, risk
management programs, or the purchase of liability insurance, or
any combination thereof, for any claim, judgment, or claims
bill which the state, its agencies or subdivisions, may be liable
to pay pursuant to s. 768.28, .Florida Statutes; providing an
effective date.

611

I. Consideration of the following Claims Bills
HB 460-William Huddlestun vs. City of Coral Gables
HB 619-Phyllis McGuire vs. Department of Transpor
tation and Orange County
HB 620-Phyllis McGuire vs. Department of Transpor
tation and Orange County
HB 646--Jessie Porter vs. Department of Natural Re
sources and Wakulla County
HB 1789--Jessie Porter vs. Department of Natural Re
sources and Wakulla County
HB 728-Anna Mae Martin vs. Department of Transpor
tation and Southwest Florida Water Manage
ment District
HB 735-Anna Mae Martin vs. Department of Transpor
tation and Southwest Florida Water Manage
ment District
HB 1400--James Mabry vs. Pinellas County School Board
HB 684-William G. Willis vs. Palm Beach County
JIB 1311-Floree Marie Williams vs. Department of Trans
portation
HB 1647-Floridale Land, Inc. vs. Department of Agriculture (Division of Forestry)
HB 1716-Lillie Adams Miller vs. Escambia County
HB 1790-Mildred V. Rivers vs. Judicial Commission
HB 1946-S. M.Rooks vs. Division ofRetirement
HB 1898-Alice Murray vs. Florida Highway Patrol, et al
II. Consideration of the Special and Continuing Order Calen
dar from Tuesday, May 17, 1977
Respectfully submitted,
A. H. "Gtts" Craig, Chairman
On motion by Mr. Craig, without objection, upon completion
of consideration of claim bills, the House agreed to consider the
remainder of the Special Order on a consent basis for one
hour.
On motion by Mr. Craig, the above report was adopted.

Consideration of Bills and Joint Resolutions on Third
Reading
By the Committee on Finance & TaxationHB 2280-A bill to be entitled An act relating to the sales
and use tax; amending s. 212.02(2)(a), amending s. 212.05,
(1) and (3) all Florida Statutes, 1976 Supplement; amending ss.
212.03(4) and (7)(c), 212.031(1)(a), and 212.04(2), 212.08, all
Florida Statutes; repealing s. 212.09, Florida Statutes; repealing
certain exemptions from the sales and use tax; providing an
effective date.
-was read the third time by title.

-was read the second time by title.

The Committee on Rules & Calendar offered the following
amendment:

Representative McPherson offered the following amendment:

Amendment 42-On page 8, line 21, strike "is" and insert:
are
Mr. Boyd moved the adoption of the amendment, which was
adopted by two-thirds vote.

Amendment 1-On page 3, line 12, after the period insert:
The limitations of liability set forth in this subsection shall
apply to the state and its agencies and subdivisions whether
or not the state or its agencies or subdivisions possessed
sovereign immunity prior to July 1, 1974.
Mr. McPherson moved the adoption of the amendment, which
was adopted.
Under Rule 8.19, the bill was referred to the Engrossing
Clerk.

Report of the Committee on Rules & Calendar
The Honorable Donald L. Tucker
Speaker, Howe of Represe,ita.tives

May 17, 1977

Sir:
In accordance with the vote of the House, the following
report is submitted as the Special Order Calendar for Wednes
day, May 18, 1977:

Representative Pajcic offered the following title amendment:
Amendment 43-0n page 1, strike the title and insert: A bill
to be entitled An act relating to taxation; amending s. 212.02
(3)(c), Florida Statutes, 1976 Supplement, redefining the term
"retail sales", etc.; amending s. 212.03(1), (3) and (6), Florida
Statutes, increasing certain transient rental taxes; amending s.
212.031(1), Florida Statutes, increasing the tax on the lease
or rental of certain real property; amending s. 212.04(1) and
(5), Florida Statutes, increasing certain admissions taxes;
amending s. 212.05(1)(a), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6), Florida
Statutes, 1976 Supplement, and the introductory paragraph
thereof, increasing the sales, storage and use tax; amending
s. 212.055(1), Florida Statutes, 1976 Supplement, conforming
language to tax increases; amending s. 212.06(1)(a), Florida
Statutes, increasing the sales, storage and use tax collectible
from dealers; amending s. 212.08(3) and (4), Florida Statutes,
increasing the tax on the rental of certain farm equipment,
providing an exemption; amending s. 212.12(1), (10) and (11),
Florida Statutes, 1976 Supplement, reducing the dealer's credit
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1

A bill to be entitled

2

An act relating to the waiver of sovereign im

3

munity, amending subsection 5 of section 768.28,

4

Florida Statutes, to clarify that agencies and

5

subdivisions are included in the $100,000 per

6

occurrence limitation of liability1 repealing

7

subsectk>n (10) of section 768.28, Florida

8

Statutes1 providing an effective date.

9

Hl

WHEREAS, Chapters 73-313 and 74-235, Laws of Florida,

11 creating and subsequently amending sections 768.28 and

12 768.30, Florida Statutes, waived the sovereign immunity of the
13 state and its agencies or subdivisions for liability for
14 torts, and
15
WHEREAS, in enacting section 768.28, Florida Statutes,

16 the Legislature clearly intended to make the state, the
171 counties, and the municipalities liable for tort claims in the
18 same manner and to the same extent as a private individual

·i9 1 under like circumstances, and
20
WHEREAS, the Florida Supreme Court in Fisher v. City of
21 Miami (Fla. 1965), 172 So. 2d 455, indicated that the Legis22 lature could restrict the amount of recovery for the torts
23 of a municipality without unconstitutionally restricting the
24 right of an individual to receive compensation for injuries,

25 and
26

WHEREAS, the Attorney General, in his opinion number

27 076-41, dated February 23, 1976, failed to recognize the basis
is for the limitation of liability set forth in subsection 5 of
2� section 768.28, Florida Statutes, and
30

WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that local governments

31, throughout the state, because of the uncertainty caused by
1
CODING1 Words underlined are additions, words in
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l the Attorney General's opinion, are experiencing difficulty
2 obtaining liability insurance, and, if the insurance is avail-

3 able, the rates a�e exorbitant and often beyond the ability of

4 the,. local taxpayers to afford, and

s

WHEREAS, this problem requires clarification of the

61 present
7

statute, NOW THEREFORE

Bl Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

9
10

Section 1.

Subsection S of section 768.2 8, Florida

111 Statutes, is amended to read:
12

768.28

Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions;

131 recovery limits; limitation on attorney fees: statute of

14 limitations; exclusions.15

(5)

The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall

161 be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same
171 extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but
18 liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for
·19 the period prior to judgment.
20 agencies or subdivisions

Neither the state nor its

shall be liable to pay a claim or

21 a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of $50,000,

22 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which, when

23 totaled with all other claims or judgments paia-ey-�he-s�a�e
24 arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the
25 sum of $100,000.

However, a judgment or judgments may be

26 claimed and rendered in excess of these amounts and may be
27

settled and paid pursuant to this act up to $50,000 or

29

that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the legislature

29

30

$100,000, as the case may be, and that portion of the judgment
but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of

Jll the legislature.
2
CODING1 Words underlined are addition11 words in
•�r�ek-�hre9!h type are deletions from existing law.
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l

Section 2.

Subsection (10) of s. 768.28, Florida

21Statutes, is hereby repealed.
3

Section 3,. This act shall take effect upon becoming a

4 law.
,
6

7
8

9
10

11
12

13

14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26
27

29
29
30

31

3
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state of Florida - 1977
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Senator Don C. Childers
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A bill to be entitled

An act relating to sovereign immunity: amending

s. 768.28 (1),

(10),

Florida Stacutes; changing

the term "perso�al injury" to "bodily injury"

for purposes of tort liability under the waiver

of sovereign immuni�y statute; providing

limitations for liability insurance coverage:
providing an effective date.
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101 Be It Enacted by the Ll!gislature of the State of Florida:
11

12

Section 1.

14

768.28 Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort action3:

Subsections (11 and (101 of section 760.28,

"I Florida StatutP.s, are amended to read:

151 recovery limits; limitation on attorney fees1 atatute of
�, limitation; exclusions.--

17

(1)

In accordance with s. 13, Art. X, State

18 Conatitution, the state, for itself and for its agencies or

19 subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability
20 for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act.

211 Actions at law against the state or any of its agencies or

22 subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money damages

23 against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury

24 or loss of property, bos._fu !'el!'!let'l!I½ injury, or death caused

25 by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employeP.

� of the agency or subdivision while acting within the scope o(

27 his office or employment under circumstances in which the
'81 state or such .!l-JCncy 'lr subdivision, if a private person,

29: wou'.tl be �idi.:ik t.n UH ::labr,.1.it 1,, accord,mce with the generill
Jr,:

la"!: o� chb st.;,t!?, ,;;:1:, '.'-'! pr:>secu�ed !'lUbjcct to the

J: i lirui �c:.tion,: s:JElci [i�= in tni.s act.
1

(�ODl�C,· Wod,; t, ..,.,•.d

,i..�_, 1\ f/�C "'" dL letl:"ff, fro:,1 r-wi1t:n4J low; wo"f1 _vr:cl•rlined l':!rt> addition,.
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(101

Unless otherwise authorized by law, no ff-the

21 state er--its agency or subdivision may be ¼s insured against

31 liability for damages for any negligent or wrongful act,
• omission, or occurrence for which action may be brought

SI pursuant to this section in amounts in excess of$50,000 for

61 any claim of any one person or $100,000 for all claims arising

71 out of the same incident or occurr�nc}tT4itt!ft-�HMtatiet\s

81 ef�th¼s-aet-sha¼¼-net-appiy-te-aet¼ens-brett,ht-te-reee•er

91 dama1es-therefer-te-the-ewtent-stteh-pe¼iey-ef-insttranee-sha¼¼

10 pre•ide-ee•era1e. Agencies or political subdivisions
1
11 presenting homogeneous risks may join together to purchase
121 insurance protection or to provide other means of meeting

131 obligations for damages as provided by this act.
u

IS

16
17

18
19

20
21

22

Section 2.

This act shall take effect October 1, 1977 •

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
SENATE SUMMARY

Changes the term •personal injury• to •bodily injury• in
provisions relating to waiver of sovereign immunity for
tort actions, and provides liability insurance coverage
purchased by a state agency or subdivision shall not
exceed$� for any claim of any one person or
$100,000 for all claims arising out of the same incident
or o"?currence. -

23

,.

25

711
27

28

29

3
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STAFF SUMMARY
PROPOSED COMMITTEE BILL ON THE
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A)

Problem Addressed -Local governments, especially municipalities, have seen dramatic
increases in the cost of liability insurance. When the Legislature
waived its sovereign immunity in 1973, it included counties and
municipalities in the limitation of liability. The Attorney General
opined in 1976, however, that the act did not apply to municipalities.
Local governments are being forced, then, to carry very expensive
excess insurance and umbrella coverage. If it were established
that the $50,000 per person/$100,000 per occurrence limits applied
to municipalities, then the cities could once again buy insurance
at a reasonable price.

B)

What the Bill Does -It sets forth in introductory
s. 768.28, Florida Statutes.
waiver of sovereign immunity,
Such action has been taken in
opinions.

language
That is,
but also
the past

the legislative intent of
the statute is not only a
a limitation of liability.
to counteract Attorney General

The bill clarifies also that the $100,000 per occurrence limitation
applies not only to the state, but to subdivisions as well.
C)

Similar Legislation
HB 584 by Representative Mann repeals s. 768.28, Florida Statutes,
placing sovereign immunity back to the pre-1973 status.

D)

Statement of Economic Im£act
If cities were certain their liability was no greater than $50,000/
$100,000, they could purchase insurance at a reasonable price. It
is likely that more carriers would return to the market, thereby
increasing competition and keeping prices down.
Persons suing a city would be limited in the amount of their recovery.
However, any excess beyond the limits of liability could be recovered
in a claims bill in the Legislature.

E)

Staff Comments -The question here is whether or not municipalities should enjoy the
same limitation of liability as is enjoyed by the state. Presently
there is some question, and this bill will help clarify it.
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"LOCAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY INSURANCE"
Municipal liability insurance is a growing problem in Florida's
cities, especially those in urban areas.

A recent study by the Florida

League of Cities showed that insurance costs are becoming a larger
part of municipal budgets -- if coverage can be obtained at all.
stories abound.

Horror

Regular coverage in the City of Deerfield Beach was

cancelled and the city was placed in an assigned risk category.

Premiums

in Pompano Beach almost doubled; much the same happened to the Cities
of Boca Raton and Casselberry.
The situation is very complex and lends itself to no easy solution.
This staff report will offer some background information on municipal
liability and frame some issues that the Committee may wish to address.
BACKGROUND ON MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
Prior to the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Act, which became
effective on January 1, 1975, the state and the counties enjoyed
immunity from liability under the common law doctrine that "the King
can do no wrong".

Under s. 768.28, Florida Statutes, the state waived,

for itself and its agencies or subdivisions, sovereign immunity for
liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in the act.

Those

limitations are set forth as $50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence.
Certain procedural aspects are included, but the important point is that
the state and its agencies or subdivisions are no longer immune from
tort liability.
Municipalities have never enjoyed full immunity from tort liability.
The immunity that cities presumably enjoyed had been chipped away in a

long series of court cases.

Before 1959, the general rule was that

municipalities were immune from tort liability in their governmental
functions, but not in their proprietary functions.
case of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach

However, in the

(Fla. 1959), 96 So. 2d 130, the

Supreme Court abolished the distinction between governmental and pro
prietary functions, retaining immunity only for legislative, judicial,
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial acts.
In 1967, the Court reinstituted, at least partially, the governmental/
proprietary distinction.

In Modlin v. City of Miami Beach (Fla. 1967),

201 So. 2d 70, the Court ruled that municipal liability was limited to
those areas in which the public employee owed a greater duty to the
victim than he did to the public generally.
in this case building inspection

Some governmental actions,

still retained sovereign immunity.

With Modlin, then, the Court narrowed the seemingly broad application it
had made in Har�rove.
When the Legislature enacted Chapter 73-313, Laws of Florida,
waiving sovereign immunity for the state and its agencies or subdivisions,
municipalities were included in the definitl.on of "state agencies or
subdivisions".

Here, then, was the opportunity for municipalities to

enjoy the limited (i.e., $50,000 per person/$100,000 per occurrence)
liability that the state possessed.

However, the Attorney General

foreclosed that possibility, at least pending judicial clarification.
In a 1976 opinion (076-41), the Attorney General stated that, with the
exception of immunity for legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial functions, municipalities possessed no aspect of the state's
sovereign immunity at the time of the enactment of Chapter 73-313.
Therefore, the statutory limitations on liability could not apply to
-2-

municipalities.

Pending any judicial determination to the contrary,

that is the present status of municipal liability.
EFFECTS ON INSURANCE COSTS
Certainly the Attorney General's opinion hurt the cities' effort
to halt the rising cost of liability insurance.

The League of Cities'

survey reported that the most frequent limits of liability carried by
Florida's cities are $300,000 per person/$300,000 per occurrence for
bodily injury and $100,000 per person/$300,000 per occurrence for bodily
injury automobile.

If the statutory waiver applied to municipalities ,

they could drop down to the $50,000/$100,_000 limits, thereby reducing
their insurance costs.

But municipalities, at least since Hargrove, have always been
exposed to liability risks.

Application of the statutory limitation

clearly should cause costs to go down, but the converse is not necessarily
true.

That is, simply because the limitations did not apply to cities,

their rates should not have gone up due simply to that fact.
Cities responding to the League survey mentioned frequently that
the high risk or exposure of municipalities, both generally and in
particular cases, was a key factor in the difficulty they had obtaining
liability insurance.

General loss experience and high jury awards

doubtlessly have contributed to the escalating costs.

Additionally, the

general economic situation, characterized by considerable inflation in the
early 1970's, has aggravated the problem.
No good data presently exists that can pinpoint exactly the causes
of rising insurance costs.

Detailed information on losses, number of

claims, attorney's fees, and other categories is needed for each munic
ipalit y in the state.

Once this data is gathered, it can be analyzed
-3-
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and used to identify problem areas.
THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND MUNICIPAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
Relief for the rising costs of municipal liability insurance
could be achieved by clarifying s. 768.28 Florida Statutes, to include
municipalities. As mentioned earlier, the Attorney General has opined
that municipalities do not enjoy the statutory limitations included
in the state's waiver of sovereign immunity.
There are constitutional questions with this approach, however.
In Modlin, the Supreme Court stated that "the tort liability of municipal
corporations may now be equated with that of private corporations".
Following that line of reasoning, an

equal protection argument could

at least be raised.
However, there is some case law which supports the proposition
that the Legislature has the power to limit the liability of a muncipality.
More research into this area of the law is necessary before proceeding
with such legislation.

The Attorney General could be requested to

render an informal opinion, perhaps at the request of one of the
committee members.
If legislation were developed to extend the limitations to
municipalities, there would probably still be a reluctance among
cities to reduce their coverage, absent a test case in the Courts.
OTHER ISSUESLPOSSIBLE SOURCES
One possible solution, presently being explored by the Broward
League of Cities, is for local governments to form a self-insurance
pool, thereby spreading the risk among a number of cities.

The Broward

League is not sure whether there is sufficient statutory authority for
-4-

cities to form this pool, since it might place them under the definition
of "insurer" in s. 624.03, Florida Statutes.
This problem can be overcome.

Subsection 768.28(10), Florida

Statutes, provides that "agencies or political subdivisions presenting
homogeneous risks may join together to purchase insurance protection
or to provide other means of meeting obligations for damages as provided
by this act".

That language would have to be applied to municipalities

explicitly and the words "as provided by this act" may have to be
stricken.

Additionally, language exempting self-insurance pools from

the definition of "insurer" could be added.
The words "homogeneous risks" present a problem of interpretation
and thus appear to frustrate the intent of the legislation.

That

language could be stricken from the subsection with the additional
provision, however, that self-insurance plans be reviewed and/or
approved by the Department of Insurance.

Review by the Department

would help guarantee that the pools would have the financial stability
for claimants to recover just damages.
There is also the option of creating a statewide pool for liability
insurance that would include counties, municipalities, school boards
and special districts.

One of the findings of the League of Cities'

survey was that cities are having an increasingly more difficult time
obtaining liability insurance at any price.

The number of carriers

willing to bid for municipal business seems to be declining.
CONCLUSION
This paper has presented an overview of the municipal liability
insurance problem in Florida.

It should serve as a point of departure for

committee deliberations, and certainly not as the final word on this
-5-
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complex issue.
One further area that the committee may wish to consider is
risk management.

Governmental entities, like private corporations,

should make an effort to identify and reduce their risk exposure.
Municipalities may be correct in citing their need for some type of
relief from increasing liability insurance costs.

In granting relief,

however, the legislature may wish to encourage governmental entities
to implement vigorous risk management plans that will help reduce
their exposure to liability.
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PROPOSED COMMITTEE BILL ON THE
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A)

(OuP\

Problem Addressed

@@ l� U
repn:,du,Nl by
FLORlnfl STATE AHCIIIVES
DEP/\HIMENT OF ST/\TE
p. A. GRI\Y BUILDING
Tall;ihassec, FL 32399-0250
Carton
Serles (Cf

!J!l_

Local governments, especially municipalities, have seen dramatic
increases in the· cost of liability insurance. When the Legislature
waived its sovereign immunity in 1973, it included counties and
municipalities in the limitation of liability. The Attorney General
opined in 1976, however, that the act did not apply to municipalities.

Local governments are being forced, then, to carry very expensive
excess insurance and umbrella coverage. If it were established
that the $50,000 per person/$100,000 per occurrence limits applied
to municipalities, then the cities could once again buy insurance
at a reasonable price.
B)

What the Bill Does -It sets forth in introductory
s. 768.28, Florida Statutes.
waiver of sovereign immunity,
Such action has been taken in
opinions.

language
That is,
but also
the past

the legislative intent of
the statute is not only a
a limitation of liability.
to counteract Attorney General

The bill clarifies also that the $100,000 per occurrence limitation
applies not only to the state, but to subdivisions as well.
C)

Similar LeKislation -HB 584 by Representative Mann repeals s. 768.28, Florida Statutes,
placing sovereign immunity back to the pre-1973 status.

D)

Statement of Economic ImEact -If cities were certain their liability was no greater than $50,000/
$100,000, they could purchase insurance at a reasonable price. It
is likely that more carriers would return to the market, thereby
increasing competition and keeping prices down.
Persons suing a city would be limited in the amount of their recovery.
However, any excess beyond the limits of liability could be recovered
in a claims bill in the Legislature.

E)

Staff Comments -The question here is whether or not municipalities should enjoy the
same limitation of liability as is enjoyed by the state. Presently
there is some question, and this bill will help clarify it.
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Local governments, especially municipalities, have seen dramatic
increases in the cost of liability insurance. When the Legislature
waived its sovereign immunity in 1973, it included counties and
municipalities in the limitation of liability. The Attorney General
opined in 1976, however, that the act did not apply to municipalities.
Local governments are being forced, then, to carry very expensive
excess insurance and umbrella coverage. If it were established
that the $50,000 per person/$100,000 per occurrence limits applied
to municipalities, then the cities could once again buy insurance
at a reasonable price.
B)

What the Bill Does -It sets forth in introductory
s. 768.28, Florida Statutes.
waiver of sovereign immunity,
Such action has been taken in
opinions.

language
That is,
but also
the past

the legislative intent of
the statute is not only a
a limitation of liability.
to counteract Attorney General

The bill clarifies also that the $100,000 per occurrence limitation
applies not only to the state, but to subdivisions as well.
C)

Similar Le�islation
HB 584 by Representative Mann repeals s. 768.28, Florida Statutes,
placing sovereign immunity back to the pre-1973 status.

D)

Statement of Economic Im£act -If cities were certain their liability was no greater than $50,000/
$100,000, they could purchase insurance at a reasonable price. It
is likely that more carriers would return to the market, thereby
increasing competition and keeping prices down.
Persons suing a city would be limited in the amount of their recovery.
However, any excess beyond the limits of liability could be recovered
in a claims bill in the Legislature.

E)

Staff Comments -The question here is whether or not municipalities should enjoy the
same limitation of liability as is enjoyed by the state. Presently
there is some question, and this bill will help clarify it.
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SUBJECT:

Self Insurance and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for
Cities and Counties

11 'f

Facts
Florida cities and counties are caught up in an insurance
crisis that is rapidly reaching the critical stages. All rates
are zooming with premiums doubling in some cases and several
cities are having their casualty and liability policies
cancelled. The following list enumerates several examples
of this problem that have occurred in the last year:
1)

Orange County--Premium almost doubled

2)

Cas_selberry--Premium doubled

3)

Boca Raton--Premium doubled

4)

Deerfield--Coverage was cancelled and in order to
be covered, they were put in an assigned
risk class

5)

Pompano Beach--Premium almost doubled

6)

F�. Myers--Cancelled a second time

7)

Delray Beach--Policy cancelled and reinsured at
a $81,000 increase

Fred Burrall James F. Eckhart Bill Flynn William D. Gorman Fred B. Hagan
Clark Maxwell, Jr. John Miller Wayne .MiXJ10n Grover C. Robinson III Sherrill N. Skinner Wendell H. Wauon
Gary L. VanOstrand, Staff Director

Room 432, House Office Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304 1904) 488-!791
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10)

Riviera Beach--Due to a city safety program,
premiums were reduced to the point
the company cancelled because "it
wasn't worth the effort." New
policy was obtained at a substantial
increase

The reasons for these dramatic increases in rates are that juries
are awarding higher amounts and that the traditional sovereign
immunity to tort claims against governmental bodies was statutorily
waived by the Florida Legislature beginning on January 1, 1975.
Florida Statutes §768.30 (1975).
Qt!estion Presented
The purpose of the memorandum is to briefly explore the parameters
of an in-depth study of this problem as to staff time, expense,
possibility of producing an effective work product, and realistic
alternative solutions that may be available to the legislature.
Conclusion
The current law is inadequate to treat this problem. An adequate
insurance program must be developed in order to satisfy judgments
against public entities. Such a comprehensive bill could be
drafted, but it would not be ready for filing until at least
January. However, the political advantages are great, and the
problem can be solved with good community relations as a by
product.
The Current Law
While the state of Florida has always enjoyed sovereign immunity
with respect to the torts of state employees, municipalities have
not had full derivative immunity. Municipal corporations
originally were liable for torts associated with "proprietary
services" and were immune from liability for "governmental
services." This distinction is limited to municipal executive
branch actions. Legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-judicial actions are by definition governmental.

Memo-Gary L. Van Ostrand
July 26, 1976
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The Florida Supreme Court altered this standard in Hargrove
v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957). The court
retained the per se immunity of judicial and legislative actions,
but went on to hold that "when an individual suffers a direct,
personal injury
caused by the negligence of a municipal
employee while acting in the scope of his employment, the injured
individual is entitled to redress for the wrong done." Hargrove,
SuEra at 133-34.
However, just 10 years later, the Supreme Court seemingly
retreated from this holding. In Moolin v. City of Miami Beach,
201 So. 2d 70 (Fla., 1967), the city was sued for wrongful
death of a store patron for failing to inspect or negligently
inspecting a mezzanine that fell and proximately caused the
patron's death. The court's Hargrove holding would seem to
apply, but the suit was dismissed because the plaintiff did not
prove that the
owed by the person charged with negligence
to the person injured by that negligence was something more than
the duty that a public officer owes to the public gneerally.
Moodlin, supra at 75.
This decision apparently negated the Hargrove holding, but
the court specifically upheld that case and subsequent cases
decided under its ruling. Needless to say, the law regarding
tort liability of municipalities was in a state of confusion
when the legislature addressed itself to the issue in 1973.
Florida Statutes, §. 768.28 (1975) waives sovereign immunity
providing that "the state and its agencies and subdivisions shall
be- liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but
liability shall not include punitive damages or interest..." Thus,
a plaintiff need now only prove the traditional elements of
negligence against a municipal employee whose actions within
the scrope of his employment proximately cause the injury.
However, liability is limited to $50,000 per claim and $100,000
on multiple claims arising out of the same incident. Amounts
in excess of these limits may be awarded if enacted through
a claims bill or if insurance coverage exceeds the statutory
cap. There is a four year statute of limitation.
On its face, the statute is inadequate in several areas.
First, it does not provide exceptions from the waiver for
intentional torts or for discretionary actions of employees.
As a matter of policy the state should not pay for intentional
or discretionary acts of employees that injur:,- third parties.
Section nine of the act does 4..ttempt to exclude bad faith or
malicious actions from state payment of judgments, but does
not specifically address itself to intentional or discretionary
acts. Also, the statute limits attorneys' fees to 25 % of the
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judgment, but does/provide any penalty for accepting more than the
limit.

Thus, even without considering the instant issue, there appears
to be several relatively simple clarifying cha�ges that need to be
made in the law.
Facts AE.E,lied to the Law

It is obvious that the current statute does not even address
itself to the current ramifications c,u)}Jsed by the waiver of
sovereign immunity,
one questions the propriety of waiving
the immunity cities and counties enjoyed for so long. It would
be extremely unpopular and unjustified to revert back to the
policy that "the King can do no wrong."

Therefore, a comprehensive waiver and insurance program
ct
should
be passed in an attempt to nip this problem in the bud
6
efore it reaches the proportions of the medical malpractice
ssue. In order to do this a comprehensive risk survey of
all states that have waived sovereign tort immunity should be
made so to benefit from other states' experience and avoid
problems created by other state statutes. There are currently
five legislative solutions that-have been adopted. Florida's
law follows Oregon and Minnesota with the result that justified
claims exceeding statutory limits are p�acticially excluded but
do not substantially reduce premiums. For purposes of this
memo the other four alternatives will not be discussed. Suffice
i£ to say that anin-depth survey and study would be needed
requiring at least two months work.

Next an insurance program giving local entities several
options would have to be established. Possible alternatives
are: (a) state provided insurance in certain areas, (b)
self-insurance for local entities with or without state
assisted professional advice, (c) group insurance purchased by
several local entities, and (d) pooled self-insurance by local
entities. (There has been a great deal of research already
)
done in this area with a model act drafted for Florida.) Further
work with the Department of Insurance would undoubtably be
required. In connection with this local governmental entities
would need continual identification of potential liability and
corresponding training of public employees in safety techniques.
The Department of Community Affairs would have to be consulted
in regard to this. Along with the survey phase this
coordination function with state agencies will be very time
consuming. Anticipated deadline for a finished product would
at the very least be the January interim meeting. However,
the potential advantages of such a law are immense. Besides
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the political identification involved such a program could possibly
reduce the number and size of claims resulting in lower premiums
and increase good community relations since accidents are
reduced and, when a claim does arise, the victim is compensated.
WWM/cs
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The Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 396,
(Chapter 77-86), amends Florida's Waive� of Sovereign Immunity
Statute,· section 768.28, Florida Statutes.

The changes provide

that the statutory limitation of governmental tort liability
($50,000 per person, $100,000 per incident or occurrence), shall
apply to all state agencies or political subdivisions of the state,
whether or not any agency or subdivision possessed sovereign
immunity prior to July 1, 1974 when the original waiver of
Sovereign Immunity Law was passed.

This is a significant change,

since the new law overrules Attorney General's Opinion 076-41,
which stated, in substance, that the $50,000/$100,000 liability
limitations did not apply to municipal governments.
In addition, Chapter 77-86 repeals the provision which
extends tort liability beyond the $50,000/$100,000 ceilings to
the extent that a government entity has insurance in excess of thos
amounts.

Therefore the ceilings shall apply regardless of how

much insurance coverage exists.

/ j /)
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SB379 by Senator W. D. Childers - Planning and budgeting by state
agencies.
Names the accounting system developed by the Auditor G(imer.
pursuant to s. 11.46, F.S., as the State of Florida Accounting
System (SFAS}. The Department of Administration, .with the con
currence of the Senate and House Appropriation Committees and
Auditor General, is to utilize the coding system of the SFAS to
prescribe a budget system and related reporting and evaluation
systems. The Comptroller will use this SFAS in the performance
of and accounting for all his constitutional and statutory dutit
and responsibilities for accounting purposes. The system is to
be operational in all state �gencies no later than July 1, 1980.

This system will provide, due to the identical coding systt
a much easier way to make fiscal comparisons between agencies a1
hopefully to evaluate systems, and also a greater ability to
monitor expenditures and revenue projections. Costs related to
implementation and maintenance of the SFAS are expected to be
$2,428,000 and about $2,700,000 each year thereafter.
House Bill 790, which was nearly identical to this bill an,
which was· substituted for this bill, has been signed by the
Governor and is Chapter 77-10, Laws of Florida.
� CS/SB396
- --- by Committee on Governmental Operations and Senator Don Childer!
- Sovereign immunity.
· Amends Section 768.28(5} by adding the phrase "of its agen·
cies or subdivisions" thereby removing a potential ambiguity th,
can lead to a construction that the $100,000 damage ceiling per
occurrence, for .tort actions, applies only to actions against tJ
state instead of to actions against either state and local gove:
mental units. The liability limitations ($50,00.0/$100,000) .are
made applicable to periods of time prior to July 1, 1974.
Repeals Section 768.28(10} which provides that the $50,000
per person and $100,000 per occurrence damage limitations shall
not apply to the extent that a governmental unit has insurance
coverage in excess of those limitations.
Allows the state and its agencies and subdivisions to self·
insure, enter risk management programs, or use any other liabil
insurance method.
The effect of this bill is to clarify that the waiver of
sovereign irmnunity law, and the $50,000/$100,000 ceilings on li
bility, apply to all political subdivisions in the state. The
bill should provide relief to municipalities, since an Attorney
General's Opinion cast doubt upon the law's applicability to
municipalities, and as a result cities have felt the need to pu
chase excessive amounts of insurance·to cover large damage suit
Signed by Governor as Chapter 77-86, Laws of Florida.
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Subject: Sovc,eign Immunity

GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS; JUDICIARY-CIVIL.

BILL SUMMARY:

Amends S768.28(5), deleting the phrase "paid by the state."
Repeals §768.28(10) •
PURPOSE:

A.

Present Situation:

Under present law there is confusion as to whether, and to what
extent, the waiver of sovereign immunity with the $50,000/$100,000
limitations on tort liability, is applicable to political subdivisions
of the state and particularly municipalities. Basically, this confusion
exists for two reasons. First, the present language in S768,28(5)
lends itself to the interpretation that the $100,000 limitation for each
occurrence applies only to the state. Second, the Attorney General,
!n A.G.O. 076-41, stated that the $50,000/$100,000 limitations do not
apply in tort actions against municipalities, in most instances.
Section 768.28(10) provides that the $50,000/$100,000 limitations
shall not apply to tort actions, brought pursuant to the waiver of
sovereign immunity provisions, to the extent that the state or its
agency or subdivision has insurance coverage in excess of those limita
tions. Agencies or political subdivisions presenting homogeneous risks
may join together to purchase insurance protection or provide other
means of paying for damages.
B.

Effect on Present Situation:

This bill removes the purported ambiguity from §768.28(5), thereby
clarifying that tho $100,000 limitation per occurrence applies to all
political subdivisions of the state. This change, combined with the
repeal of 5768.28(10), will make it unnecessary for any state agency or
political subdivision to purchase more than $50,000/$100,000 of insurance
coverage for liability under waiver of sovereign immunity.
III.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS:

Economic Impact:

YES:L

NO:

A.

Economic Impact on the Public:

B.

Fiscal Impact on Implementing or Enforcing Agencies:

This bill limits the damages that a plaintiff can recover from a
municipality to $50,000/$100,000 in a tort action brought under §768.28.
Under this bill, municipalities need only have insurance coverage
of $50,000/$100,000 for liability for damages in a tort action brought
under §768.28. This offers significant savings, since a recent survey
by the Florida League of Cities reveals that the average amount of
coverage purchased by municipalities is $100,000/$300,000.
IV.

COMMENTS;

The "whereas clauses" in this bill clarify that the intent of the
bill is to place municipalities in the same position relating to the
$50,000/$100 1 000 limitations as other government entities. The background
information contained in the clauses may be useful in clarifying the
intent of the Legislature in any future litigation which may be tiled
pursuant to this section.
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Subject:
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

Bill No. and Sponsor:
CS/SB 396
Governmental O£erations
REFERENCES:
I.

l, Governmental Operations; 2. Judiciary-Civil

BILL SUMMARY:
This bill amends s. 768.28(5), F.S., relating to the waiver
of sovereign immunity, by deleting the phrase "paid by the
state" and thereby expanding the provisions of the section
to all political subdivisions of the state.
This bill also repeals s. 768.28(10), F.S,, which permits
recovery in a tort action, brought pursuant to the waiver
of sovereign immunity provisions, to the extent that the
state or its agency or subdivision has insurance coverage
in excess of the statutory limitation of $50,000/$100,000.

II.

PURPOSE:
A.
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Present Situation:
Under present law there is confusion as to whether, and
to what extent, the waiver of sovereign immunity with
the $50,000/$100,000 limitation on tort liability, is
applicable to political subdivisions of the state. This
confusion is caused by the language of the statute itself,
and a recent Attorney General Opinion (076-41), which
stated that in most instances, the $50,000/$100,000
limitation does not apply in tort actions against munici
palities.

B.

Effect on Present Situation:
This bill would clarify s. 768.28(5), F.S., in that the
$100,000 limitation per occurrence applies to all political
subdivisions of the state. This change, combined with the
repeal of s. 768.28(10), F.S., would make it unnecessary
for any state agency or political subdivision to purchase
more than $50,000/$100,000 of insurance coverage for
liability under waiver of sovereign immunity.

III.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS:
Significant Economic Impact:
A.

YES

X

NO

Economic Impact on Public or Implementing Agency:
Under this bill, municipalities need only have insurance
coverage of $50,000/$100,000 for liability in a tort
action brought under s. 768.28. This offers significant
savings, since a recent survey by the Florida League of
Cities reveals that the average amount of coverage
purchased by municipalities is $100,000/$300,000.

B.

Economic Benefits to Public or Industry:
None.

IV,

COMMENTS:
None.

/ 4Jph1-t-<--t;_;_j)
I � � /.Y�
_

1

THE FLORIDA SENATE

10

7
,/ (• n

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
404 Senate Office Building
Tallahassee, F1orida 32304
904/488-7833

Senator Dempsey J. Barron, Chairman
Senator William G. Zinkil, Vice Chairman

Februai:y 23, 1977

Jack C. Overstreet, Staff Director

Senator William G. Zinkil, Sr.
225 N. 21st Avenue
Hollywood, Florida 33020
Dear

Senator:

This is in response to your inquiry concemi.ng whether legislation is
necessai:y for: (1) the :rconetary ceiling in section 768.28, Florida Statutes
to apply to tort actions against municipalities, and (2) for nunicipalities
to expend revenue sharing funds provided in section 206.60 5(3) for electri
city costs for street lighting. In regard to the sovereign .imnunity question,
little has happened since your similar llXJU.llY of June 16, 1976. You may
wish to refer to our responses to that llXJU.UY, dated June 16, and June 28,
1976 in addition to the materials included herein.
(1) Whether the nonetary limitations contained in section 768.28, Florida
Statutes apply to nnmicipalities.
Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, provides for a partial waiver of sovereign
.imnun.ity in actions against the state and its agencies and subdivisions. Munici
palities are specifically included by definition. The waiver is limited, arrong
other things, by :rconetaI:y ceilings. On the face of the statute, trese limi
tations clearly apply to municipalities.
Notwithstanding this facial clarity, Attorney General Opinion 076-41
that prior to the passage of 768.28, municipalities did not have romplete
sovereign immmity, ard therefore the statute operates to waive only that imntm
ity which already existed. In short, 1GJ 076-41 holds that you cannot waive
what you do not have. O:mseiuently, acoonling to AOO 076-41, the limited
waiver in 768.28 applies only to actions arising fran legislative, judicial, quasi
legislative and quasi-judicial functions.
argues

There is little judicial authority on this issue. Indeed, the only judi
cial statanent on the subject is a footnote in a recent opinion by the Third
District court of Appeal:
Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1974,
provides for waiver of inmunity by state agencies arrl
municipalities in tort actions, with l..imitations as to the
anount of recovery.

Senator William G. Zinkil, Sr.
Page 2
Februa.:ry 23, 1977
Jolly·v. Insurance Cclllpany of North Arrerica, 331 So� 2d 368, 370 n.2 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) • Although this dictum suggests a result that is
cxmtrai:y to the holding of AOO 076-41, it is hardly dispositive.
A similar view, also contrary to AOO 076-41, is suggested in
Kovolick, Torts, 30 U. Mia. L. Rev. 337, 396 (1976):
The unanswered question • • • arises as to whether the act
effectively m:xlifies the partial camon law abrogation by
returning a degree of sovereign :imnunity to municipalities.
Although no appellate oourt has answered this question, the
warding of the statute would appear to r8Illire an affinnative
a.IlS'We!.r •

•

•

In sumnary, the effect of section 768.28 on the sovereign imm.mity of
mtmicipalities is far fran well-settled. Mr. Burton Michaels, ·eounsel, Florida
league of Cities maintains that AOO 076-41 is erroneous, and that the $50,000
ceiling awlies to tort actions against municipalities. Mr. Michaels states
that he has advised city attorneys not to seek clarifying legislation until
the issue has been tested in the courts. Mr. Michaels is aware of a case at
the circuit rourt level that should be dispositive upon appeal.
Attached for your further consideration is AOO 076-41,
part of the Kovolick article.

and

the relevant

(2) Whether legislation is necessary to enable municipalities to expend
revenue sharing funds derived from the eighth cent tax for operating expenses
of electricity costs for all street lighting.
Staff research has found no case law that speaks to this question. However,
the awlication of rules of statutory construction .'.Eads to the conclusion that
municipalities cannot, without an arnendnent to sectio!l 206. 605 {-3t', Florida
Statutes, expend such funds for electricity rosts for street lighting�
I

'!be statute states that funds available under section 206.605 shall be
used only for certain enunerated purposes. As a general rule, when a statute
rontains a list of things, all other things not mentioned are excluded. See
22 Florida Law and Practice Statutes § 73. fureover, revenue and tax laws
are usually subject to a strict construction by the rourts. Id. § 102.
Since the operating expenses for the electricity for. street lighting is only
ranotely related to the items listed in the statute, it is staff's opinion
that legislation is prol:ably necessary.
Cordially,
Jack C. Overstreet
JOO/nm
Enclosures
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The Honorable w. W. Caldwell, Jr.
City Attorney, Fort Lauderdale
Post Office Box 14250
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302
Re:

076-41

'\,�

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY--MUNICIPALITIES--effect of the
state's waiver of sovereign immunity thereon.
S76ij.LB, F.S.

Dear Mr. Caldwell:
This is in response to your letter in which you pose several
questions.which suggest the following general inquiry:
WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY,· DOES THE STATE'S
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FRO M TORT
LIABILITY CONTAINED IN §768.28, F.S.,
HAVE ON THE TORT LIABILITY OF MUNICI
PALITIES?
By the enactment of §768.28, F.S. (Ch. 73-313, Laws of Florida,
as amended by Ch. 74-235, Laws of Florida), the Florida Legis
lature waived the state's sovereign immunity from tort liabil
ity to the extent provided therein. See §768.28(1) which pro
vides in part that "the state, for itself and for its agencies
or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability
for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act;"
§768.28(2) which defines the phrase, "state agencies and sub
divisions". to include municipalities; §768.28 ( 5) which estab
lishes the monetary limitations on the state's waiver; and
§768.28(9) which precludes the personal liability of officers,
employees or agents of the state or its subdivisions for their

i

The Honorable -W.
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Caldwell, Jr.

076-41

negligent acts or omissions in the scope of their employment
unless committed "in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in
a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human
rights, safety or property."
In light of the enactment of §768.28, F.S., which became effec
tive generally on January 1, 1975, you pose specific questions
as to the authority for, or efficacy of, (1) a municipality
appealing a "claims bill" enacted by the Florida Legislature;
(2) the Florida Legislature directing a municipality to pay a
judgment in excess of the monetary limitations established in
§768.28(5); and (3) a municipality purchasing insurance to
cover only that amount·granted by a "claims bill" which is in
excess of those monetary limitations. The following discus
sion, which is limited solely to a consideration of the effect,
if any, of the state's waiver of sovereign immunity contained
in §768.28 on the tort liability of municipalities under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, should be dispositive of your
,,.

.. ,...,. .... .:"' .... ,..

"':l� .... ------·--·

In Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70, 73 (Fla. 1967),
the Florida Supreme Court attempted to clarify its earlier deci
sion in Hargove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957),
as follows:
" •.• • the Har�rove decision specifically
reserved municipal tort immunity in the
exercise of legislative, judicial, quasi
legislative, and quasi-judicial functions.
Because private persons and corporations
do not exercise legislative or judicial
functions, this means that the tort liabil
ity of municipal corporations may now be
equated with that of private corporations.
"The Hargrove specification of the legis
lative and Judicial functions as constitut
ing the area of continuing immunity obviously
implies that the performance of the execu
tive or administrative function will con. stitute. the area of potential liability. • • • "

The Honorable
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This judicial language states the essential status of municipal
tort innnunity prior to the enactment.of §768.28, F.S. That is,
except with respect to those activities which could properly be
designated legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative and quasi
judicial, a municipality was liable in tort under the doctrine
of respondeat superior for any injuries or damages suffered as
a result of the acts, events, or omissions of action, whether
negligent or intentional, committed by its officers, employees
or agents in the scope of their employment or function the same
as any private corporation. See also City of Miami v. Simpson,
172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965): and Fisher v. City of�Miami, 172
So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965). Therefore, I am of the opinion that
with the exception of immunity in the exercise of legislative,
judicial, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicia� functions (which
innnunity may still exist on other grounds, see Rivello v. Cooper
City, 322 So. 2d 602 [4 DCA Fla. 1975], and McNayr v. Kelly, 184.
So. 2d 428 [Fla. 1966]), municipalities possessed no aspect of
the state's sovereign immunity from tort liability upon which
the waiver contained in §768.28, and the limitations specified
+-l-o o ..- o .;�
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waiver of sovereign immunity contained in §768.28 does not
operate to limit in any substantive way the tort liability of
municipalities under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Your questions are answered accordingly.
SUMMAR Y

With the exception of immunity in the exercise of legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial functions, municipalities
possessed no aspect of.the state's sovereign
immunity from tort liability upon which the
state's waiver of sovereign immunity.contained in §768.28, F.S., and the statutory
limitations applicable thereto,· could operate.
.
cerely, ..
syi

.I
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BY,):
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_,,.,.G¢ald L. Knight
L.r1(ssistant Attorney
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
404 Senate Office Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32304
904/488-7833

SENATOR KENNETH M. MYERS, CHAIRMAN
SENATOR WILLIAM G. ZINKIL, VICE CHAIRMAN
SENATORS DEEB, DUNN, FIRESTONE, HAIR, JOHNSTON, PLANTE,
SAYLER, P. THOMAS, AND WILSON
JACK C. OVERSTREET, STAFF DIRECTOR

Jtme 24, 1976

Senator William Zinkil
225 N. 21st Avenue
Hollywood, Florida 33020
Dear Senator:
This·is in reference to your letter of Jtme 16, 1976, and the enclosures
relating to the status of sovereign .inrnunity fran tort liability of municipalities
as a result of the enactment of§ 768.28, F.S.
This is arnther one of those areas which we seem to be enrountering frequently
.1.! ··-
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puted at length by attorneys. I was tmder the irrpression that the 1973 enactment
· which created § 768. 28 provided limitations to the liabilities of tre state and its
p:,litical subdivisions including municipalities. Then, on February 23, 1976 came
· N:n 076-041 in which the Attorney General concluded, "In sum, the state's waiver
of sovereign inm.mity contained in§ 768.28, does not operate to limit in any sub
stantive way the tort liability of mtmicipalities •••• " He reached this conclusion
by reasoning that inasmuch as municipalities had no such imnunity e.xcept for legis
lative and jtrlicial ftmctions prior to the enactment of§ 768.28 there was no
immmity available for waiver and their liability renained the sane as it had been
before 1973. I am enclosing a copy of this opinion for your review.
Burton Michaels takes a totally different view and is convinced that the
legislature has the pcMer and in fact did limit the liability of municipalities to
that of private individuals under like circunstances and the maximum arcounts to the
$50,000 and $100,000 reflected in§ 768.28(5). Burton believes that the Atbrney
General's opinion is in error and is convinced that if the matter should be tested
in court that the limitations on .imnunity would be found to apply to municipalitites.
He is advising city attorneys who represent municipalities which are rrembers of tl:e
League of Cities not to to ask for any further legislation until the matter is
tested in court. Burton said that should you desire to discuss this further he
would be happy to do so.
Hopefully the al.Dve is responsive to your request. Should you require addi
tional infonnation, I as always will be happy to oblige.
C.ordially,

Enclosures

Jack

c.

OVerstreet
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The Sovereignty of Florida Municipalities:

BY STANLEY L. SELIGMAN
AND ROBERT L. BEALS
The much maligned but ever
subsisting doctrine of sovereign
immunity has received yet another
legal modification insofar as it
pertains to municipalities and all
other political subdivisions in the
State of Florida. The doctrine of
sovereign immunity as originally
inherited from the British common
law and uniformly adopted by all of
the states has always been partially
applicable to municipal corpora
Uuu�.
In Florida, the common law
immunity o f a m u n i c ipal
corporation for the torts of its
employees was originally
approved, subsequently eroded,
thereafter reinstated and finally
legislated out of existence by the
passage of Florida Statutes Section
768.28, Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity In Tort Actions. Florida
has now joined a slowly growing
number of states, in deference to
tlte extensive criticism by the
bench, bar and commentators,
which have abolished the common
law immunity from torts.1 A brief
look at the evolution of common
law sovereign immunity in Florida
and at salient aspects . of the
legislative waiver of sovereign
immunity in tort actions will serve
to contrast the Florida law with the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
Common Law Sovereign
Immunity In Florida
While the State of Florida has
a lw ay� enj oye d so v e r e ign
immunity with respect to the torts
of state employees, municipalities
have not enjoyed full derivative
immunity. Rat he r , m u n i c ipa l
corporations have been held liable
for torts associated with the

furnishing of "proprietary services"
by that entity. Proprietary services
are generally defined as those
which might be provided by
private corporations as well as a
municipality and most particularly
those from which the municipality
collects revenue.1 Typical examples
of this type of function include the
supplying of water and electricity
and the operation of docks and
airports.
In contrast, municipal corpora
tions had traditionally enjoyed
immunity for torts associated with
".,.nve,rnmPnt�l <:PrvirP<:." ThP.sP.
s;r�•ic�s- �re generally regarded as
those which can be adequately
performed only by the government,
such as the enactment of laws and
exercise of the police power by
local police departments. Without
detailing the numerous interpre
tations of the governmental
proprietary distinction made by the
Florida court, it is sufficient to say
that the general rule, with some
modification, 4 was originally
followed in Florida. However, the
Supreme Court of Florida, in
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach,5 made what seemed to be a
major departure from traditional
notions of municipal immunity for
employee torts.
By way of background, it should
be noted that the governmental
proprietary service distinction is
almost exclusively limited to actions
by . the executive branch of the
municipal corporation. Legislative.
judicial, quasi-legislative and quasi
judicial actions are almost by
definition governmental in nah1re
and thus rarely tht• suhject of
successful tort liti�ation. The area
of executive services is the one
which receives virtually all judicial
scrutiny in connection with tort
immunity. While it is not difficult to
distin�uish executive action from

those of the other branches of
government, the governmental
proprietary service distinction is
rarely as clear. For instance, the
construction, maintenance and
repair of streets and sidewalks,
drainage systems and bridges are
proprietary functions and
negligence in connection with them
subjects the responsible munici
pality to liability.8 However, the
installation and maintenance of
traffic control devices such as stop
signs and automatic traffic lights is a
governmental function, the exercise
of which does not give rise to
liabilitv for ne11:lie:ence except when
there is some direct transaction
between some city officer and the
plaintiff.7 This apparent conflict
gives rise for definition by the
Supreme Court of Florida.
In Hargrove, the plaintiff was the
widow of a jailmate,. suing for the
alleged wrongful death of her
husband. The husband had died of
smoke suffocation after being
locked in a jail which was left
unattended by the city jailer. Under
prior Florida law, the maintenance
of the jail would clearly have been
classed a governmental function
and no liability would have been
established.9 While retaining the
governmental-proprietary service
distinction in connection with
judicial and legislative acts, the
Hargrove court went on to hold that
"when an individual suffers a direct,
personal injury proximately caused
by the negligence of a municipal
employee while acting in the scope
of his employment, the injured
individual is entitled to redress for
the wrong done.'" The Harf!,roce
decision on its face appeared to
a bolish t hc- goYe rnrnt•ntal
proprietary service distinction
insofar as the executive branch of
m u n i c ipa l g o v e r n m e n t wa s
concerned and thcrchy abrogated
thc> much criticized so,·crei�n
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immunity of the municipality.
However, a short 10 years later,
the Supreme Court of Florida chose
to partially resurrect the once
abolished distinction. In Mo dlin v.
City of Miami Beach, 10 a wrongful
death action was brought on behalf
of a patron who was crushed when
the mezzanine in a store fell on her.
The City of Miami Beach was sued
under the doctrine of respondeat
,uperior on the grounds that a
building i n s p e ct or's a l l e g ed
negligence in failing to inspect or by
n e g l ig e n t l y i n s p e c t i n g t h e
mezzanine was a proximate cause
nf thP n�trnn'c NP11th WhilP
Hargr�v/ ·wo�ld s�m perfectly
applicable to the facts related, the
court created a new distinction in
the judicial scrutiny of govemmen
ta 1 functions p e r f o r m e d b y
municipalities. Most succinctly, the
court held that the duty owed by the
person charged with negligence to
the p e r s o n injur�d b y t h a t
negligence had t o be something
more than the duty that a public
o f f i c e r owes t o t h e p u b l i c
generally.11 Under the facts of
Modlin, the duty owed by the
building inspector to the deceased
was not greater than that owed to
the public generally, and therefore
liability did not obtain.
Needless to say, the Supreme
Court brought the law of Florida
nearly full circle back to the
necessity for judicial determination
· of a governmental-proprietary
distinction, but with the added
burden of determining the various
degrees of duty owed by public
officers to injured plaintiffs and the
public at large. The net result of the
Modlin decision was to negate fully
the sweeping dictum in II arf!.rove to
the effect that municipalities should
be liable for injuries proximately
caused by their employees. In
Department of Natural Resources
v. the Circuit Court of the 12th

Judicial Circuit11 a 16-year-old girl
was killed by an alligator while
swimming in a state maintained
park to which she had paid for
admission. Relying upon the duty
owed a particular plaintiff versus
that owed the public at large, the
appellate court determined that
there was no liability based upon
the doctrine of sovereign immunity
as articulated in Modlin. The
application of this principle has
yielded similar results in a variety of
contexts. 13
As recently as October 1975, one
appellate court felt constrained to
write that "we are frank to admit
that the current status of municipal
tort liabilitv is not at all clear ..."14
and noted additionally that "it
would seem far more realistic and
workable for such rights to tum on
the question of whether the
governmental entities act or failure
to act proximately caused the harm
claimed. "15
The legislative answer to that and
other judicial pleas for clarity
became effective January 1, 1975, in
the fonn of Florida Statute Section
768.28.
Nature of Tort Liability Under Act
The act waiving sovereign
immunity in tort actions provides in
pertinent part that "the state and its
agencies and subdivisions shall be
liable for tort claims in the same
manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like
circumstances, but liability shall not
include punitive damages or
. interest for the period prior to
jud�ment."11 While this language
ma)' appear beguilingly simple,
there is ext ensive j u d i c i a l
interpretation available under the
Federal Tort Claims Act 17 which
uses the identical language, as do
similar state statutes. 18
Essentially, the above quoted

statutory language means that a
prospective plaintiff need only
show the traditional elements of
negligence in order to establish
vicarious liability a g a i n s t a
municipal corporation for the acts
of its employees. It is provided,
however, that an action for
damages in tort for injury or loss of
property or death must be caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of an employee who is
acting within the scope of his office
or employment. 19
It is conceivable that a narrow
judicial construction of subsection 5
of the Act could restore the
governmental-proprietary service
distinction that the Act was
apparently intended to abolish.
This could come about if the
words "to the same extent as a
private individual" were construed
as words of limitation rather than
d e scription. The judicial
construction which would yield
such a result would construe the
"private individual" language as
meaning that municipalities could
not be liable for things that private
i n d iv i d u a l s canno t d o , i.e.,
g;ovemmental functions.
Thus, for instance, a police
officer doing something that only
police officers can do, such as
arrest, could never yield tort
liability under respondeat sup erior
in that a private individual could not
be liable because of his inability to
m a k e a n a r r e s t. S u c h a n
interpretation would restore the
governmental-proprietary function
test and leave the law very nearly
where it was before the Act was
passed.
However, it would seem highly
unlikelr that a:ny court would so
construe the language of subsection
5 as limiting liability to proprietary
functions. Indeed, the identical
language of the Federal Tort
Claims Act has been construed

•
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uniformly as not creating any such
distinction but rather simply
describing the nature of the liability
to be imposed.20 Moreover, such a
construction would completely
negate the clear implicit legislative
intent of abolishing sovereign
immunity for the torts of municipal
employees.
Llablllty Limits
The Act expressly provides in
subsection 5 that no individual
judgment may exceed $50,000 nor
may the jud gment based upon
multiple claims arising out of the
same incident exceed the sum of
$100,000.
The $50,000 and $100,000 limits
are probably reasonable for a vast
majority of the claims that will arise
under the Act. However, in the case
of catastrophic injury or death the
figures would strike most attorneys
as woefully inadequate. Apparently
aware of this fact, the legislature
provided two methods by which
damages in excess of these limits
may be obtained. First, the final
provision of subsection 5 provides
that a judgment in excess of these
limits may l?e reported to the
legislature and paid if approved by
a special.act. Second, subsection IO
provides that the limitations of the
Act do not apply to actions for
damages to the extent that
insurance coverage exceeds the
limits.
The exceptions to the Act's
liability limits are of questionable
efficacy. It would seem most likely
that a prudent municipal
government would intentionally
limit insurance coverage to the
$50,000/$100,000 limits in order to
minimize insurance premiums
while fully covering itself in terms
of potential liability. Carrying
coverage in excess of the maximum
amounts recoverable would serve
no:- purpose other than govern
mental altruism. The adequacy of
the provision for special acts of the
legislature to compensate plaintiffs
who recover judgments in excess of
the statutory limits remains to be
seen. It may be perceived,
however, as the legislature's
resolution of the risks of unlimited
l iab ility a s o p p o s e d t o t h e

.:ipalities

arbitrariness of limiting recovery
for any and all injuries.
General Procedure
Subsections 6 and 7 provide some
simple rules for prosecuting a claim
under the Act. Subsection 6
exempts actions against municipal
corporations from the requirement
that claims be presented to the
particular agency involved on the
state level and the Department of
Insurance as well. One may infer
from reading subsections 6 and 7 of
the Act that the claim and filing
procedures set forth do not apply to
actions against municipal
corporations. Thus, it appears that
one may proceed directly against a
municipality on the theory of
respondeat superior, subject only to
the four year statute of limitations
provided in subsection 12.
Significantly for attorneys suing
under this Act, subsection 8 limits
the fees that may be charged for any
liUil uaougltt uuJe, l11i:i Ad tu 25i of
any judgment or settlement. This is
considerably less than the limits
recently adopted by the Supreme
Court with respect to contingency
fees in personal injury actions.
Furthermore, the 25i figure is
absolute and may not be adjusted
regardless of whether a claim is
settled, tried or appealed.
Conceivably, an attorney who
charged an hourly figure for
representing a plaintiff would be
liable to reimburse the claimant if
his hourly fee exceeded 251 of a
judgment or settlement. It would

seem that the legislature took an
overly simplistic attitude toward
what was probably a well
intentioned desire t o regulate legal
fees under the Act.
Comparison With the Federal
Tort Claims Act
As indicated above, a good
portion of the waiver of sovereign
immunity act passed in Florida is
c o m p a r ab l e to t h e s e m i n a l
legislation i n this area, the Federal
Tort Claims Act.11 Most notably,
the federal law provides that the
United States is liable in tort "in the
same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like
circumstances," which is identical
to the language of subsection 5 of
the Florida legislation. Hence the
precedent of judicial construction
by the federal courts should be of
assistance to the bench and bar alike
should issues arise with respect to
the language in the Florida act.
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Claims Act limits liability to torts
committed while an individual was
acting within the scope of his
employment,u which also may be
useful as precedent in construing
the Florida act.
A significant contrast between
the federal and Florida laws is the
provision in the federal law for
express exceptions to its waiver of
sovereign immunity.13 In addition
to excluding certain intentional torts
from statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity, the federal law excludes
from its application any claim
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ha�e,J on t h e exer c i s e or
prtfol.'m.. nce or the failure to
exercise or perform a "discretionary
function or duty." The failure of the
Florida act to exclude discretionary
functions makes it quite possible
that suit may be brought for acts or
omissions of employees which are
in fact discretionary in nature. Thus,
while the federal iaw does not
recognize a g o v e r n m enta l
proprietary distinction, 14 it insulates
itself from liability for discretionary
acts. Ho w e v e r , t h e F l o r i d a
Legislature's act has attempted to
abolish t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l
proprietary function, but has not
precluded possible claims arising
out of discretionary actions.
The area of intentional torts
seems to be the least clear under the
F1orida act. Subsection 9 provides
that there should be no personal
liability for unintentional torts. This
gives rise to an inference that there
Is personal liability_ if the tort is
intentional. Subsection 9 goes on to
say that the state will pay any
monetary judgment which is .
rendered in a civil action personally
against the employee which arises
as a result of actions in the scope of
emplo;-m�nt. The !i::;! ��!lmo!y
that appears is the provision that
there is no personal liability,
followed by the provision that the
state· will pay when personal
liability is determined. Further,
while it is not expressly stated, it
appears that the government is
liable in the case of intentional torts.
This gives rise to the- question of
whether or not it is subrogated to
any plaintiffs rights as against its
own employee or agent who has
committed an intentional tort.
The Federal Tort Claims Act as
noted above cures this problem by
expressly excluding intentional
torts. Also, the federal procedure
does not entertain the anamolous
proposition of barring personal
liability and providing for the
indemnity of it at the same time.
Rather, if a federal employee or
agent is sued, the Attorney General
or his representative may intervene
fn the suit, remove it to federal
court, and substitute the United
States as defendant.15
Finally, the Federal Tort Claims
Act handles attorneys' fees in a
slightly different fashion. The
p ercentages for settlement or
ju d g m e n t are 20$ and 25$
depending upon the recovery and
stage of the proce('nin�. An

- ttorney who accepts more than the
.deral statute allows is subject to
c r imi n a l p r o s e c u t i o n f o r a
misdemeanor punishable by $2,000
and/or one year incarceration.
Interestingly, the Florida•act fails to
provide a conterpart.
Conclusion
Few members of the bench and
bar would question the wisdom of
the legislature's abolition of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in
Florida. What remains to be seen is
whether the legislature, in its effort
to rectify the concededly thorny
problem, has met the complaints of
the court in Gordon for clarity in the

law.
The foregoing analysis is only
intended to highlight potential
problems. The Federal Tort Claims
Act will hopefully be of much
assistance for purposes of judicial
construction of our Florida act,
which is in so many ways similar if
not the same. There can be no
doubt, however, that a significant
and meaningful step forward in the
equitable resolution of injuries
occurring as a result of acts or
omissions by government
·-- • .J . -- .1 •.. - - - \..
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Section 131; Governmental Immunity at 984
(4th Ed. 1971).
1 Prosser, Law of Torts, ,upra at 980.
, Prosser, Law of Torts, ,upra at 979.
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under a commission form of government
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corporations. City of Tallahassee v.
Kaufman, Fla. 1924 100 So. 150.
1 Florida 1957. 96 So. 2d 130.
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stop signs); Matthews v. City of Tampa, Fla.
App. 2d 1969, 227 So. 2d 211 (failure to
replace stop signs): Clifton v. City of Fort
Pierce, Fla. App. 4th 19i5, 319 So. 2d 195
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Cables v. Logan, Fla. App. 3d 19i5, 317 So.
2d 92 (failure to instruct city employees not
to use allegedly dangerous intersection).
1 See, e.g., Brownlee v. City of Orlando.
Fla. 1946, 26 So. 2d 504 (Jailer assaulted
prisoner with a blackjack, the prisoner died,
and the city was held not libel based on
sovereign immunity).
1 Hargrove v. City of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.
2d at 133-34 (footnotes omitted).
1• Florida 1967, 201 So. 2d 70.
11 Modlin v. City of �liaini Beach, 201 So.
2d at 75.
11 Fla. App. 2d 1975. 317 So. 2d 7i2.
u See, e.g. Davis v. Watson, Fla. App. 4th
1975, 318 So. 2d 169 (plaintiff negligently
shot by an officer of the Came and Fresh
Water Commission): Nobles v. City of
Jacksonville, Fla. App. 1st, 1975, 316So. 2d
565 (plaintiff claimed negligent supervision
of traffic in connection with bridge that
became unsafe when wet: and City of Coral
Cables v. Logan. Fla. App. 3rd 19i5, 3li So.
2d 92 (Plaintiff claimed negligence in failure
tn lndn1rt clrivPr� i,f C'itv r:in ni,t to use
allegedly dangerous intersection).
14 Cordon v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla.
App. 1975, 321 So. 2d 78, i9.
11 Cordon v. City of W�t Palm Beach, Fla.
App. 1975, 321 So. 2d 78. 81.
11 Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.28 (5).
17 Title 28, U.S. Code,Section 26il et. seq.
11 See e.g., New York Claims Act. Sec. 8,
(McKinney 1963); see an excellent discussion
of the types and ramifications of statutory
waiver may be found in �ote, Insurance for
Waiver of Immunity, 26 U.Fla.L.Rev. 89
(19i4).
1• Fla. Stat. Sec. 788.28 (1) (9).
n See generally, 38 Am. Jur. 2d. Federal
Tort Claims Act, Sec. 61.
11 Title 26, U. S. Code. Sec. 26il. et. seq.
"Title 28, U.S. Code, Sec. 26i5.
u Title 28, U.S. CodE", Sec. 2680.
tt 3.5 Am. Jur. 2d, FederalTort ClaimsAct,
Sec. 17.
ts Title 18, U. S. Code. Sec. 26i9.
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the requirement of a showing of actual damages as a basis of an
award of exemplary damages is satisfied by the presumption of
injury which arises from a showing of libel or slander that is
actionable per se. 217

Moreover, the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate,
but to deter by punishment. m
Closely related to the award of punitive damages is the allow
ance of recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In World Insurance Co. u. Wright, m the plaintiff was held to have
stated a cause of action for such damages against his insurer whose
actions, including attempts to "buy up" the policy, reflected such
bad faith as to justify damages for the intentional infliction of
mental distress. It is interesting to note that in Wright, only a two
party insurance contract was involved. Florida courts have gener
ally limited the award of punitive damages in actions based on
insurance contracts to three-party situations, finding the insurer's
failure to settle with the third party a breach of its fiduciary duty. m
Thus, if this restriction on punitive damages is to remain, Wright
may present an alternative method for insureds to recover those
"intangible" damages which in fact are part of punitive damages,
even though punitive damages are not recoverable.
VIII.

GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY

A.

Sovereign Immunity

The Florida legislature delivered a damaging blow to the doc
trine of sovereign immunity by enacting a tort claims act during its
1973 session, which partially waived sovereign immunity in actions
against the state and its agencies and subdivisions. 221 Defining the
term "subdivisions" to include municipalities, 222 the act provides
that:
217. Id. at 894.
218. Id.
219. 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
220. See, e.f!., Baxter v. Royal lndem. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
221. The waiver under the act only applies to actions against the executive departments
accruing on or after July 1, 1974 and to actions against all other agencies and subdivisions of
the state accruing on or after January 1, 1975. FLA. STAT. § 768.30 (Supp. 1974).
222. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(2) (Supp. 1974) defines subdivisions to include "the executive
departments, the legislature, the judicial branch and the independent establishments of the
state; counties and municipalities and corporations acting primarily as instrumentalities or
agencies of the slate, counties or municipalities."
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[a]ctions of law against the state or any of its agencies or subdi
visions to recover damages in tort ... for injury or loss of prop
erty, personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision
while acting within the scope of his office or employment under
circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivision,
if a private person, would be liable to the claim11nt in accordance
with the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted subject to
the limitations specified in this act.m
The limitations specified in the act do, however, preserve the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to a noticeable extent. The act ex
empts the state and its subdivisions from punitive damages and
further limits liability to $50,000 per claimant and $100,000 per
incident,m unless the governmental entity carries liability insur
ance covering the injuries in excess of these amounts, in which case
its liability limitation will be co-extensive with its insurance cover
age.125
Moreover, implicit in the wording of the statute is the apparent
further limitation that a state or its subdivisions may only be held
liable for torts committed within the exercise of ministerial, execu
tive or administrative functions, because the act only waives im
munity in "circumstances in which ... a private person would be
liable."m Under the common law of Florida, a private individual
cannot be held liable for torts committed in the exercise of judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or quasi-legislative functions.227
The tort claims act also limits the personal liability of officers
or employees of the state or its subdivision while acting within the
scope of their employment, to actions committed either in bad faith
or in willful and wanton disregard of human rights and safety.m
With the exception of the existence of this implicit limitation
to torts arising from governmental functions, the effect of the act
223. Ft.A. STAT. § 768.28(1) (Supp, 1974).
224. Fu. STAT. § 768.28(5) (Supp. 1974).
225. Ft.A. STAT. § 768.28(10) (Supp. 1974).
226. Ft.A. STAT. § 768.28(1) (Supp. 1974).
227. Allen v. Secor, 195 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), Hough v. Amato, 260 So. 2d
537 (F'la. 1st Dist. 1972). Although it might be argued that the tort linbility of a private indivi
dual is not coextensive with that of a public official, Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So.
2d 70 (F'la. 1967), a private individual could never exerci�e :!'16�:ntive, quasi-l!'gi�lative,
judicial, or qua�i-judicial functions except a, a public official.
22R. Ft.A. STAT. § 76R.28(9)' (Supp. 1974).
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upon the state and its agencies is fairly clear. 229 Its effect upon the
tort liability of municipal corporations, however, is not as clear.
Prior to the act, judicial decisions had limited a municipal corpora
tion's shield of sovereign immunity to torts resulting from the exer
cise of its legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, without the $50,000/$100,000 limit created by the tort
claims act. m The unanswered question, therefore, arises as to
whether the act effectively modifies the partial common law abroga
tion by returning a degree of sovereign immunity to municipalities.
Although no appellate court has answered this question, the word
ing of the statute would appear to require an affirmative answer
because of its failure to distinguish between the state and municipal
corporations, merely defining the latter as a subdivision of the for
mer.231

B. Municipal Corporations
Despite the partial judicial waiver of sovereign immunity of
municipal corporations prior to the tort claims act, pre-act cases
arising during the survey period demonstrate that a municipality's
liability is not as broad as might be imagined.
The question of whether a police officer who injures another
with his service revolver while "off-duty" acted within the scope of
his employment was held to be a question for the jury in Gardner
u. Saunders.m Saunders, a policeman, had just gone off duty and
had settled himself in a local bar with a drink when an altercation
erupted. As a result, Saunders shot the plaintiff with his service
revolver, which he was required by city regulation to carry at all
times.233 The Second District reasoned that "such regulations carry
with them a reasonable presumption that he might be in a position
229. Prior to the passage of the tort claims act, FLA. STAT. § 455.06 (1957) provided that
state agencies could purchase liability insurance for certain risks and that sovereign immun
ity would be waived to the extent of its insurance for covered injuries.
230. In Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957), the Supreme Court
of Florida held that when an individual suffers a direct personal injury, proximately caused
by the negligence of a municipal employee while acting within the scope of his employment,
the injured individual may maintain an action against the municipality for redress. City of
Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1965) expended Hargroue to include intentional torts
committed by municipal employees acting within the scope of their employment.
231. See note 222 �upra.
232. 281 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
233. The re11soning behind this regulation w11s that a policeman is always on duty, even
thouj!;h he iii periodically relieved from the routine performance of it. Id. at 393.
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to use his revolver even though he may not be in uniform and be
nominally off duty." 2=11 Therefore, when such a presumption is possi
ble, the question of whether he was acting within the scope of his
employment is to be decided by the jury.
In a large city, where the police department must utilize a
limited amount of manpower to perform a multitude of functions
and where congested traffic and street construction is omnipresent,
it was held to be unreasonable to hold the city accountable for all
traffic accidents where an officer is not assigned to direct traffic
around or through the congestion and/or obstruction.m
The plaintiffs decedent had died as a result of an intersectional
collision caused by a visual obstruction resulting from the parking
of two vehicles in the middle of the street by the telephone com
pany.During the first day of the obstruction, the city had assigned
a policeman to direct traffic at the intersection, but on the day of
the accident no officer was so assigned.
In rejecting the plaintitrs claim against the city, the District
of Court of Appeal, Third District, held that
[t]he dispatching of a traffic patrolman to this intersection was
a matter of judgment on the part of the city and the city has the
right to determine the strategy for deployment of its police pow
ers, and sovereign authorities ought to be left free to exercise their
discretion without worry over allegations of negligence.m

A further limitation of liability was found in Moore v. City of
St. Petersburg, 237 in which the .Second District held that to recover
for damages caused by faulty municipal construction, the plaintiff
must establish that the city was placed on actual notice of the
alleged defect or that the alleged defect existed for such a long
period of time that the city had constructive notice of it.The court
also went on to hold further that the construction of a sewage dis
posal system was a governmental function "as opposed to a 'corpo
rate or proprietary' function, such as street and sidewalk mainte
nance .... " 23" Thus the city was protected by sovereign immunity
from liability for injuries caused to the plaintiff by a defect in such
234. Id.
235. Hem11ndez v. City of Miami, 305 So. 2d 277 (Fl11. 3d Di�t. 1974).
2:16. Id. at 27: .�,, Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fl11. 1970).
237. 2Rl So. 2d 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
23R. Id. 11t .550.
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construction in the absence of direct confrontation between its em
ployees and the plaintiff.m
IX.

THE NEW WRONGFUL DEATH

A9

The adoption of the new Florida Wrongful De'ath Actun raised
the serious question of whether the separate survival action211 was
also rendered inoperative in those instances where an action for
wrongful death could be brought under the new Act. m
Relying upon the provision in the new Act that [w]hen a per
sonal injury to the decedent results in his death, no action for the
personal injury shall survive, and any action pending at the time
of death shall abate, 213

the Supreme Court of Florida held that no separate statutory sur
vival action for personal injuries resulting in death can survive the
decedent; such an action is, therefore, barred by the new Act.m The
court also noted that the damages formerly recoverable under the
survival statute have been generally incorporated into the new Actm
except that damages for the decedent's pain and suffering have been
replaced by damages for the survivor's pain and suffering.m
Thus, under section 768.21 of the new Act, each specified survi
vor may recover for (1) loss of past and future support and services,
(2) loss of companionship and protection, and (3) his or her own
mental pain and suffering from the date of the injury. The personal
representatives of the estate may recover further for medical and
funeral expenses and lost earnings, damages that would have been
formerly recoverable under the survivor statute.
The supreme court's ruling, however, does not bar actions
under the survival statute for causes of action which the decedent
239. Stt a/Ro City of Tampa v. Davis, 226 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969); Mathews
v. City of Tampa, 227 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
240. Fu. ST,.T. §§ 768.16-.27 (1973), hereinafter referred to as the new Act, repealing
Fu. S-r,.T. § 768.01-.03 (1971) (hereinafter referred to as the old Act.)
241. The survival action is provided for by FLA, ST,.T. § 46.021 (1973):
No cause of action dies with the person. All causes or action survive and may be
commenced, prosecuted end defended in the name of the person prescribed by
law.
242. See W. Beckham & M. Esquiroz, Torts, 28 U. M1AM1 L. REv. 662, 690-91 (1974).
243. Fu. ST,.T. § 768.20 (1973).
244. Martin v. United Security Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (1975).
245. See § 768.21(6) (1973).
246. See§ 768.21(4) (1973).
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Th•·,, is a condensation of an ad
dress to the City Attorneys' Session of the /4th Annual C,mference
for City Officials and City Attorneys
in Tallahassee, Florida, March//, 1975.

WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
1. BRIEF HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL
TORT LIABILITY.
The first decision in the State of
Florida holding a municipality liable in
tort was in 1849 when a horse fell into
a deep gully in a street in Tallahassee
and was fatally injured. The Supreme
Court sustained liability in that case
on the theory of nuisance. City of
Tallahassee v Fortune, 3 Fla. 19. How
ever in the later early cases the court
was careful to note that I iability was
being imposed only where proprietary
or corporate functions were con
cerned.
It was in 1924 that the Supreme
Court of Florida first broke the im
munity barrier where governmental
functions were involved. That year in
two cases, both decided on the same
day, Maxwell v City of Miami, 100 So.
147, and City of Tallahassee v Kauf
man, 100 So. 150, the court held that
when a fire truck, even if on the way
to a fire, is operated in such a neg
ligent manner as to constitute a nui
sance on the public streets, the city
would be liable.
Still there was one governmental
function in the performance of which
the municipalities were immune from
liability for many years, and that was
in law enforcement. But in 1931 a
motorcycle policeman in West Palm
Beach accidently jumped the curb and
struck a pedestrian on the sidewalk,
and the city was held liable on the
authority of the Tallahassee and Miami
fire wagon cases. City of West Palm
Beach v Grimmett, 137 So. 385. It will
be noted here that all three of those
cases involved the use of motor vehi
cles.

2

FLORIDA MUNICIPAL RECORD

Then in 1946 the Supreme Court
gave its first clue as to why a city
could be held liable for negligence in
the performance of a strictly govern
mental function, such as police action.
In the case of City of Avon Park v
Giddens. 27 So. 2d 825, a policeman
while enroute in a patrol car to pick
up a prisoner under arrest, was driving
at a high rate of speed when an
accident occurred. The City was held
liable and in its opinion the court said:

So, with few exceptions which will
be mentioned later in this discussion,
this was the status of tort liability of
municipalities in Florida on January 1,
1975, when Chapter 73-313 (768.28,
Florida Statutes), commonly known as
the waiver of sovereign immunity act,
took effect.

"In the Kaufman case · · - the court
seemed to indicate an ahandonment of
any distinction hetween proprietary
and gm•ernmental functions when the
delict was hy means of an auto
mohile."

I believe it is pertinent at this point
to mention the status of immunity of
the state and its agencies. For instance,
this is not the first statutory waiver of
immunity of the state and its agencies.
In 1967 there was enacted Section
768.14, Florida Statutes, which pro
vided that if the state or any of its
agencies brought suit to recover dam
ages in tort that sovereign immunity
from liability in tort was waived to the
extent of permitting the defendant to
counterclaim for damages resulting
from the same transaction or occur
rence. The continued existence of this
statute is recognized in the waiver of
sovereign immunity act.

In other words, the court in effect was
f o l lowing t he dangerous instru
mentality doctrine of the landmark
case of Anderson v Southern Cotton_
Oil Co., 74 So. 975.
The court continued to hold cities
immune from negligence in the per
formance of police functions, other
than in the use of motor vehicles, until
1957 when our Supreme Court in the
historic case of Hargrove v Town of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, removed
the distinction completely between
proprietary and governmental func
tions and opened the flood gates of
liability against cities.
You would think that that was the
end of the line, but no, in 1965 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that
even when not based on negligence, a
municipality was not immune from
liability for intentional torts com
mitted by its police officers. Simpson
v City of Miami, 155 So. 2d 829.

2. IMMUNITY OF THE STATE AND

ITS AGENCIES EXCLUDING

MUNICIPALITIES.

Then, as you all know, since 1953
when Section 455.06, Florida Stat
utes, was enacted, state agencies were
permitted to use public funds for the
payment of insurance premiums to
purchase liability insurance, and the
insurors were prohibited from raising
the det�me of sovereign immunity to
erage.
,the extent ofth�insurai1i!'e"
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IMMUNITY ACT

ITS DESTINY
By Ralph A. Marsicano
League Counsel
Florida League of Cities

(Spangler v Florida State Turnpike
Authority, 106 So. 2d 4211, the
school boards (Buck v Mclean et al.,
115 So. 2d 764) and of course, the
counties (Kaulakis v Boyd, 138 So. 2d
505).

3. THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY ACT.

We now turn to the provisions of
what is now the first direct abandon
ment of the historic rule that the
"king can do no wrong" insofar as the
state and its agencies are concerned, as
well as the first salutary limitation on
the long established tort liability of
the municipalities of our state, with
the enactment of Chapter 73-313 (Sec
tion 768.28, F .S.) commonly known
as the "Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Act."
Subsection 1 spells out that the
negligent or wrongful act or omission
must occur within the scope of em
ployment, thereby continuing intact
the doctrine of respondeat superior.
But probably most important is the
provision that in order for liability to
be imposed the negligence must occur
under circumstances in which the state
or any of its agencies or subdivisions,
if a private person would be liable to
the claimant.
Subsection 2, of course, is the most
important provision to municipalities
because they are included as agencies
or subdivisions of the state for the
purpose of coverage by the act.
Subsection 3 gives to all agencies of
the state the right to request assistance
of the department of insurance in the

settlement of claims, but excludes the
cities from this privilege.
Subsection 4 merely provides for
the right to appeal any award, compro
mise settlement, or determination to
the appropriate court.
Subsection 5 reiterates the pertinent
provision that the tort liability pro
vided for shall be "to the same extent
as a private individual under like cir
cumstances." Please bear this in mind
when further on in this discussion
possible exceptions to the liability
imposed by the statute will be men
tioned.
This subsection also provides that
liability shall not include punitive
damages or interest for the period
prior to judgment. This does not
change the law in this respect as it has
long been in existence by court deci
sions; punitive damages (Fis her v City
of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455) and interest
(Farelly et al., v Heuacker, 159 So.
24).
Then comes the greatest benefit to
municipalities, the limitation of a
claim or judgment by any one person
to $50,000.00, or for any one occur
rence the amount of $100,000.00. If a
judgment exceeds these limitations,
the excess may be reported to the
legislature and may be paid in part or
in whole in the discretion of the
legislature.

Subsection 6 provides that no ac•
tion shall be instituted on a claim
against a state or its agencies unless the
claim is presented in writing to the
appropriate agency and, except as to

claims against municipalities, also to
the department of insurance, within
three years after such claim accrues,
and the department of insurance or
the agency denies the claim in writing.
Failure of the department of insurance
or the appropriate agency to dispose
of the claim within six months after
filing is deemed a final denial of the
claim. However these provisions do
not apply to claims for negligence
which may be asserted by way of
counterclaim under Section 768.14,
Florida Statutes, which I mentioned in
the beginning of this discussion.
Subsection 7 provides for process
being served on the head of the agency
and except as to municipalities, also
upon the department of insurance.
The agency or the department then
has thirty days within which to plead
thereto (Rules of Civil Procedure No.
1.140 requires defenses to be filed in
20 days). The Journals fail to show
passage of the Act by a 2/3 vote of the
Legislature and, therefore, the 20-day
rule would apply.
Subsection 8 limits attorneys fees to
twenty-five percent of any judgment
or settlement.
Subsection 9 as it originally appear•
ed in the 1973 act provides that no
officer or employee of the state or its
subdivisions, which includes munici
palities, shall be held personally liable
in tort while acting within the scope of
employment unless the officer or em
ployee acts in bad faith or with mali
cious purpose or in a manner exhibit
ing wanton and willful disregard of
human rights, safety, or property.
(Con tinued on next page.)
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(Continued from page 3.)

The 1974 legislature add�d to sub
section 9, the following sentence:

"Sub;ect to the monetary limitations
set forth in subsection (5 ), the state
shall pay any monetary ;udgment
which is rendered in a ci11i/ act ion
personally against an officer, em
ployee, or agent of the state which
arises as a result of any act, event, or
omission of action within the .rcope of
his employment or function." (Ch.

74-235)

It will be noted that the amendment
covers only officers, employees, or
agents of the state, thus excluding
municipalities. However, there is no
requisite for cities to pay such judg
ments. The main disadvantage to cities
is that the amendment makes state
employment more attractive than
municipal. However, since 1972, by
statute (Sec. 111.07 F .S.). all public
officers and employees have been af
forded legal defense for alleged negli
gence in the performance of public
duties.
Subsection 10 in effect provides
that any limitations of the act shall
not apply to actions involving in
surance coverage to the extent of such
coverage.
Subsection 11 specifically continues
in full force and affect all existing laws
allowing the state or its agencies to
buy insurance unrestricted in any way
by the terms of the act. There are
several of these statutes on the books,
but the one which covers most agen
cies is Section 455.06, Florida
Statutes, which I mentioned before,
bvt which does not affect municipali
ties because of their historic liability in
tort.
Subsection 12 is the statute of
limitations which bars all claims
against the state or its subdivisions
unless suit is filed within four years
after the claim accrues.
Subsection 13 prohibits the bringing
of any action against the state or its
subdivisions by any one who unlaw-
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fully participates in riots and similar
distrubances. The statute is silent as to
claims of innocent victims of riots
which will be touched on later in this
discussion.

4. POSSIBLE REMAINING IMMUNITY
OF CITIES.
In Hargrove v Town of Cocoa
Beach, devastating as it was, the deci
sion adhered to a principle from which
our courts have never departed, and
that is that liability would not be
imposed upon a municipality in the
exercise of a legislative or judicial, or
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial func
tion.
In Modlin, the City was held im
mune from liability where a suit was
brought for the death of a person
caused by the collapse of a mezzanine
attached to a building, the basis of the
suit being that the city acting through
the building inspector was negligent in
its inspection of the building. The
court restated the long standing princi
ple of the. law of torts which was
mentioned in Hargrove actually only
as dictum.
In Modlin, the court said:

"It is a well recognized principle of
tort law that a fundamental element of
actionable negligence is the existance
of a duty owed by the person charged
with negligence to the person in;ured.
- - - However, there i.f also a doctrine
of respectable lineage and compelling
logic that holds that this duty must be
something more than the duty that a
public officer owes to the public gen
erally."
Modlin was followed in two Tampa
cases, the first, Folks v City of Tampa,
221 So. 2d 426, which involved the
alleged failure to properly inspect the
installation of a gas pipe which caused
an explosion, and the second, City of
Tampa v Davis, 226 So. 450, which
involved the alleged negligence of the
city to properly maintain or replace a
stop sign which had fallen down.

Again in Town of Largo v L & S
Bait Co., 256 So. 2d 412, the City of
Largo was held immune from liability
for damages caused by a sewer back-up
which flooded the plaintiff's property.
The court in its opinion adopted the
Modlin rule. (See also Advance Sheets,
Hernandez v City of Miami, 305 So.
2d. 277.)
So it does appear that there will
continue to be one or more avenues of
possible immunity for cities if the act
or omission comes within the purview
of Modlin which holds that the "duty
must be something more than the duty
that a public officer owes to the public
generally."
In the area of riot control, our
Supreme Court in Wong et al., v City
of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132, refused to
hold the city liable for riot damage to
property allegedly caused by the re
moval of police officers from the scene
of the rioting. The court held that the
city had the right to exercise such
discretion, and in its opinion stated:

"While sovereign immunity is a salient
issue here, we ought not lose sight of
the fact that inherent in the right to
exercise police powers is the right to
determine strategy and tactics for the
deployment of those powers. ·•··The
sovereign authorities ought to be left
free to exercise their discretion and
choose the tactics deemed appropriate
without worry over possible allcga·
tions of negligence."
Wong was shortly followed by a
later Miami case, City of Miami v
Cleveland, 250 So. 2d 298, which
under Chapter 870, Florida Statutes,
dealing with riots, held the city harm
less on account of a person being
killed by the discharge of a police
man's weapon in suppressing a riot.
The court in its opinion stated:

"The statute sufficiently shows legisla
tive intent that the officers should not
be so disadvantaged. Statutory grants
of immunity are to be liberally con
strued, and where legal justification or
immunity is granted by organic law or
statute the protection thus afforded
must be as broad as that which is given
in the enactment, otherwise the ends
.wught to be accomplished thereby are
frustrated." (Underscoring Ours)

Note here the court's statement as to
, the liberal construction to be given to
immunity statutes which it is my hope
is a principle that will be carried
forward and if possible broadened
rather than narrowed for the reasons I
will bring up later.
I would also like to mention here a
case which is familiar to most of u·s,
and that is Steinhardt v Town of
North Bay Village, 131 So. 2d 737,
where our Supreme Court held that
damage allegedly caused by the city's
failure to properly train firemen and
to furnish a fire truck properly equip
ped with water did "not constitute
actionable negligence under the Har
grove case." The omission, according
to the Court, related to the per
formance of functions which required
an exercise of legislative or quasi-legis
lative powers.
Probably the latest case which in
volved the principle of quasi- legisla
tive immunity is the very recent case
of Boca Raton v Coughlin, 299 So. 2d
105, where the city was sued because
its police officers allegedly made an
illegal arrest for possession of obscene
material in violation of a city ordi
nance, notwithstanding the fact that
the United States Supreme Court more
than two years previously had declared
that kind of an ordinance to be uncon
stitutional. The Third District Court of
Appeal stated in its opinion that by
the great weight of authority such an
arrest made by an officer for the
violation of an ordinance valid upon
its face was privileged and would not
subject him to liability if thereafter
the ordinance is held void.
It is my humble opinion that since
the waiver of sovereign immunity act
specifies in two separate places that
tort liability will attach to the state
and its subdivisions, including munici
palities, under circumstances where a
private person would be liable, that
the immunity of all governmental a
gencies from legislative, quasi-legisla
tive, judicial, and quasi-judicial actions
will continue; also would continue
immunity under the Modlin rule that
the duty involved must be more than
the duty a public officer owes to the
public generally. It is axiomatic that a

private person cannot legislate, cannot
act judicially, and owes no official
duty to the public generally.
Next, we are all familiar with a
string of cases holding that cities are
not liable for the failure to properly
maintain streets that are state highway
connecting links, the last of such cases,
I believe, being Leialoha v City of
Jacksonville, 64 So. 2d 924. However
there appear to be two exceptions to
that immunity. One is the case of City
of Miami v Mulholland, 158 So. 2d
573, where the city was held liable on
account of a defect in a sidewalk in a
state highway connecting link, but
there was valid justification in that
situation, because the city itself had
assumed to maintain the sidewalk.
But an anomalous situation appears
in Nobles v City of Jacksonville, 265
So. 2d 550, where the Second District
Court of Appeal by a two to one
decision arrived at a most unusual
conclusion. In that case the State
Department of Transportation had the
primary responsibility to maintain a
bridge in the highway system.
But the city had enacted an ord i
nance which stated that it was the
duty of the sheriff (as you know he
replaces the police chief as the law
enforcement head of the consolidated
government) to enforce the provisions
of ordinances for the regulation of all
traffic in the city and to maintain
signs, signals and devices for traffic
regulations. Because of these ordi
nance requirements the Court held
that it became the duty of the city to
protect its citizens from known dan
gers such as traffic hazards and there
fore the city could be held Iiable if the
steel grating on the Main street bridge
was slippery when it was wet, resulting
in a dangerous condition. Certiorari
was denied by the Supreme Court of
Florida in 272 So. 2d 158.
The experience from this Jackson
ville case would suggest that in the
future in the enactment of traffic
ordinances, whenever such may be
done under the exceptions permitted
by the Uniform Traffic Control Law,
that such ordinances be so worded as
to avoid any such liability on state
maintained highways.

�.

Finally, it may also be of interest to
know that on May 13, 1973, the
Supreme Court of the United States
held in Moor v Alameda, 411 U.S.
693, 36 L.Ed. 2nd 596, that regardless
of whether or not immunity of munic
ipalities had been lifted by state law,
that a city is not a "person" that can
be held liable under 42 USCS 1983 for
depriving any person of rights under
color of any ordinance, regulation, or
statute.
5. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY FOR THE STATE
AND STATE AGENCIES EX
CLUDING MUNICIPALITIES.
In several cases involving the ques
tion of whether or not a state agency
is immune, in nearly every instance
our Supreme Court has indicated that
such immunity could be removed by
statute. In the case of Spangler v
Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106
So. 2d 421, in an action to recover
damages for alleged negligence of the
turnpike authority where the com
plaint had been dismissed, the Su
preme Court in its opinion stated that:
"Regardless of the reasons assigned by
the trial judge we, nonetheless. Jind
that his ultimate conclusion sustaining
the motion to dismiss the complaint
was correct. We do so for the reason
that we find that the State Legislature
has not waived the Authoritv's im
munity to liability for damages result·
ing from an alleged tort." (Under
scoring Ours)

But prior to that case, in Richter v
Board of Public Instruction of Dade
County, 91 So. 2d. · 794, a county
board of public instruction was held
not liable for the alleged tortuous
death of a pupil and the court in its
opinion alluded to Bragg v Board of
Public Instruction of Duval County,
36 So. 2d 222, which held that such a
board was not liable in tort because, as
it stated, "the prevailing rule in this
country is that they are not so liable
unless made so by law. This is the rule
because they are engaged in a purely
governmental function." However in
the Richter case the late Honored
Justice Terrell then stated in his o
pinion that:
(Continued on next page.)
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(Continued from page 5.)
"This case approve.t the rule followed
in every state throughout the country
where provision has not been made by
statute or otherwise for sucli suits. In
view of Sections 9 and /3, Article XII
of the Constitution, F.S.A., it is ques
tionahle whether or not such provi.tion
could be made without amending the
Constitution. We have examined the
cases cited by appellant in his zeal to
show that the rule is otherwise, hut we
think they have no application to this
case." (Underscoring Ours)

The counterparts of these provisions
of the Constitution of 1885, pro
hibiting the expenditure of school
funds except for school purposes, are
virtually identical in the Constitution
of 1968. So here is the first intimation
that sovereign immunity as related to
the state and state agencies may not in
some instances be removed except by
constitutional amendment.
6. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
OF MUNICIPALITIES.
We would hope that our courts will
continue to say as the Third District
Court of Appeal said in City of Miami
v Cleveland, supra, that "statutory
grants of immunity are to be liberally
construed." But I feel that I would be
remiss in my responsibility in having
accepted this assignment to speak on
this subject if your attention were not
called to three decisions which could
be of grave consequence in relation to
the validity of the limitation of the
liability of cities by this Act.
The first case is Suwannee County
Hospital Corp. v Golden, et al., 56 So.
2d 911, which involved a public body
politic, supported by taxation, that
was sued for damages when a patient
was severely burned, and a judgment
was rendered for the plaintiff and
affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Florida. The special act which created
the public corporation provided that it
should not be liable for any negligence

6

FLORIDA MUNICIPAL RECORD

of its officers, agents or employees,
including doctors and surgeons and
nurses. But the Supreme Court held
that:
". - · as to t ho.11· who arc rwyi111s
patie11t.1 lik,• ar1pc/la, the hospital is
operated in a proprietary capacity, and
they may not he divested of constitu
tional rights hy the attempted stat
utory immunization."

Note here that the court is specifically
referring to the performance of a
proprietary function and implies that
had a governmental function been
involved there may not have been any
liability.
Another case I refer to is Woods v
City of Palatka, 63 So. 2d 636, where
in the court held that a charter pro
vision that the city should not be held
liable for personal injuries due to
defective condition, excavations, or
obstructions in streets, sidewalks and
other public places was unconstitu
tional. The court in its opinion said:
". • • this court has held that, in the
exercise of a "proprietary" function,
as distinguished from a "govern
mental" function, a governmental a
gency of this state cannot constitu
tionally be immunized from liability
for its torts. Suwannee County 1/ospi·_
ta/ Corp. v Golden, Fla., 56 So. 2d
9 I I." ( Underscoring Ours)

But you must remember that when
these decisions were rendered Har
grove had not been decided and there
was still being recognized in some
cases a distinction in the performance
of proprietary functions as compared
to governmental functions. But Har
grove clearly and unequivocally re
moved that distinction, and in doing
so removed all immunity except for
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial,
and quasi-judicial acts.
In Ragan v City of Jacksonville, 106
So. 2d 860, decided after Hargrove,
there was involved a charter provision

that attempted to immunize the city
from tort liability unless it appeared
that the damage was attributable to
gross negligence. The plaintiff con
tended that this restriction con
travened Section 4 of the Declaration
of Rights of the Florida Constitution
of 1885, which as you know, provided
that "· • - every person for any injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or
reputation shall have remedy, by due
course of law - -. " The comparable
provision of the Constitution of 1968
is substantially the same.
The First District Court of Appeal,
in an opinion by able Judge Wigginton,
referred to Hargrove and said:
". - • Clearly, then, under the rationale
of the Hargrove case, municipal tort
liahilit_1· cannot be validly restricted
solely to suits for damages arising out
of gross negligence. It therefore neces·
sari/y follows that the challenged pro
vision of the Charter Act i.t l'<Jid and
must yield. "

It was mainly because of the hold
ings in Suwannee County Hospital
Corp. v Golden and Woods v City of
Palatka that the first Municipal Law
Committee of the Florida bar made its
report on February 21, 1956, one year
before Hargrove, which included this
recommendation:
"Your Committee recommends the
adoption of an appropriate constitu
tional amendment providing for tort
liability of all governmental agencies,
including but not being limited to the
State of Florida, the Counties and
Municipalities; and authorizing the
l,egislature to fix limits upon the
degree of such liability and the a·
mounts of recovery,"
CONCLUSION
The Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Act has accomplished legislatively, in a
substantial manner, what the original
Florida Bar Committee on Municipal
Law had recommended be written into
our Constitution. It is my fervent wish
that insofar as municipalities are con·
cerned, that regardless of any past
adverse decisions, that our courts will
(Co n t in u ed on next page.)

continue to recognize the historic doc
trine that modern changing conditions
will warrant departures from former
interpretations of the Constitution,
and that this Act will be upheld.

Just one example of a respectable
line of authorities enunciating the doc
trine is State v Dade County, 27 So.
2d 283, where the late inimitable
Justice Glenn Terrell, referring to the
framers of a prior constitution, said
this:

n:·ominent
lersonality
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"- • • it wal not intended by tho.re
present that the dead hand of the past
should shape the destiny of the future.
Constitutional mandates are wise in
proportion to the manner in which
they respond to the public welfare and
should be construed to effectuate that
purpose when possible. "

So let us all hope that the destiny of
this Act, so beneficial to the financial
ly hard pressed cities of our state, will
be fulfilled in infinite favor, and not In
disappointment.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Copies of the com
plete text of this address may be
obtained by contacting the League
office in Tallahassee.
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13 - 8 Cubic
Yard, 6 - 6
Cubic Yard, and 21 - 4 Cubic
Yard. Condition of all dumpsters
"GOOD"!
1 - 8 Yarder's, 3 - 6 Yarder's,
and 6 - 4 Yarder's all in Fair
Condition.

--ALSOONE - 1971 GMC Cab - Over with
dumpster LFW 303 Lift this in
EXCELLENT Condition.
I ONE - 1960 Ford F-600 with
CPBU "lifttainer-Lift" in GOOD
.. condition/all can be seen at St. Leo
College, St. Leo, Florida, Hwy.
No. 52 West or Call Mr. R. E.
Richmond 904-588-2121, Ext. 251
or 252.
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REPRESENTATIVE DICK CLARK
The Florida league of Cities Is honoring Repr ...ntative Dick
Clark as as our Prominent Personality for May.
Repr-ntatlve Clark, a Democrat serving the 118th District,
Is the Majority Leader for the House of Repr...ntatlv9L He
has resided in Florida since the age of four and Is married to
the former Diane LaPrade of Miami Springs. They have four
children, and reside in Coral Gables.
In 1968, Representative Clark was first elected to the House
and has been reelected !lllbsequently. Repr-ntative Clark
has always been in the forefront of developing and sponsor
ing legislation to assist the major urban arees of Florida.
Unique problems of urban Dade County have prompted
unique solutions end Mr. Clark has consistently exercised
leadership in the areas of lnterama, pollution control, men
transit, and has fully 111pported essential tax me81Ures to
allow local governments to r1191>ond to their urban needs. He
was en early proponent of Home Rule for cities end counties
end was instrumental in the passage of the resort tax
legislation for Miami Beach, Surfside and Bel Harbour.
In his current role as Majority Leader in the House, he will be
able to continue to provide leadership support for urban
Issues. He was an early co-sponsor of the leaou.-s proposed
constitutional amendment to Article V to retain municipal
courts. He is • strong supporter of the 1 Cent Optional Sales
Tex for cities and counties. Recently he filed legisletion that
may prove to be the harbinger of things to come, relative to
State-local relationships. This legislation would require that
any State Legislative. executive or Judicial action that
mandated I service or expenditure - or restricted a source of
revenue - must be addressed in the Goverr,or'1 Budget to
recommend additional or replacement funding to local
governments. We fully support his efforts in this endeavor.
It is with • greet deal of ple■ !lllre we •lect Repr...ntatlve
Dick Clark as our Prominent Personality this month.
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